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The two faces of judicial powerdynam...

Engst, Benjamin G.

The two faces of judicial powerdynamics of judicial-political bargaining /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The two faces of judicial powerby Benjamin G. Engst.
其他題名:	dynamics of judicial-political bargaining /
作者:	Engst, Benjamin G.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2021.
面頁冊數:	xvi, 245 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Judicial processPolitical aspects.
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46016-7
ISBN:	9783030460167$q(electronic bk.)

The two faces of judicial powerdynamics of judicial-political bargaining /
Engst, Benjamin G.

The two faces of judicial powerdynamics of judicial-political bargaining /[electronic resource] :by Benjamin G. Engst. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2021. - xvi, 245 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. The Two Faces of Judicial Power -- 2. The Judicial-Policy-Dialog Game -- 3. Judicial Power in Germany and the European Union -- 4. The First Face of Judicial Power -- 5. The Second Face of Judicial Power -- 6. Conclusion: The Implications of Judicial Power.

This book shows that constitutional courts exercise direct and indirect power on political branches through decision-making. The first face of judicial power is characterized by courts directing political actors to implement judicial decisions in specific ways. The second face leads political actors to anticipate judicial review and draft policies accordingly. The judicial-political interaction originating from both faces is herein formally modeled. A cross-European comparison of pre-conditions of judicial power shows that the German Federal Constitutional Court is a well-suited representative case for a quantitative assessment of judicial power. Multinomial logistic regressions show that the court uses directives when evasion of decisions is costly while accounting for the government's ability to implement decisions. Causal analyses of the second face of judicial power show that bills exposed to legal signals are drafted accounting for the court. These findings re-shape our understanding of judicialization and shed light on a silent form of judicialization. Benjamin G. Engst is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Political Science at the University of Mannheim, Germany.

ISBN: 9783030460167$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-46016-7doiSubjects--Corporate Names:

891683
Germany.
Bundesverfassungsgericht--Decision makingSubjects--Topical Terms:

891684
Judicial process
--Political aspects.

LC Class. No.: K487.P65 / E547 2021

Dewey Class. No.: 340.11

The two faces of judicial powerdynamics of judicial-political bargaining /
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