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Intermediate microeconomic theory :tools and step-by-step examples /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Intermediate microeconomic theory :Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Muñoz-Garcia.
其他題名:	tools and step-by-step examples /
作者:	Espinola-Arredondo, Ana,
其他作者:	Muñoz-Garcia, Felix,
面頁冊數:	xxiii, 478 pages :illustrations ;24 cm
標題:	Microeconomics.
ISBN:	9780262044233

Intermediate microeconomic theory :tools and step-by-step examples /
Espinola-Arredondo, Ana,

Intermediate microeconomic theory :tools and step-by-step examples /Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Muñoz-Garcia. - xxiii, 478 pages :illustrations ;24 cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Machine generated contents note: 1.Introduction -- 1.1.What Is Microeconomics? -- 1.2.Comparative Statics -- 1.3.Overview of the Book -- 1.3.1.Consumer Theory -- 1.3.2.Production Theory -- 1.3.3.Markets -- Putting Consumers and Producers Together -- 1.3.4.Strategy -- Let's Play Games! -- 1.3.5.Putting Game Theory to Work -- 1.3.6.More Market Failures -- When Markets Work Well and When They Don't -- 2.Consumer Preferences and Utility -- 2.1.Introduction -- 2.2.Bundles -- 2.3.Preferences for Bundles -- 2.3.1.Ranking Bundles with More Units -- 2.3.2.Satiation and Bliss Points -- 2.4.Utility Functions -- 2.5.Marginal Utility -- 2.5.1.Diminishing Marginal Utility -- 2.6.Indifference Curves -- 2.6.1.Properties of Indifference Curves -- 2.7.Marginal Rate of Substitution -- 2.7.1.Diminishing MRS -- 2.8.Special Types of Utility Functions -- 2.8.1.Perfect Substitutes -- 2.8.2.Perfect Complements -- 2.8.3.Cobb-Douglas -- 2.8.4.Quasilinear -- 2.8.5.Stone-Geary -- 2.9.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Social Preferences -- 2.9.1.Fehr-Schmidt Social Preferences -- 2.9.2.Bolton and Ockenfels Social Preferences -- Appendix. Finding the Marginal Rate of Substitution -- Exercises -- 3.Consumer Choice -- 3.1.Introduction -- 3.2.Budget Constraint -- 3.3.Utility Maximization Problem -- 3.4.Utility Maximization Problem in Extreme Scenarios -- 3.5.Revealed Preference -- 3.6.Kinked Budget Lines -- 3.6.1.Quantity Discounts -- 3.6.2.Introducing Coupons -- Appendix A Applying the Lagrange Method to Solve the Utility Maximization Problem -- Appendix B Expenditure Minimization Problem -- Relationship between the Utility Maximization Problem and the Expenditure Minimization Problem -- Exercises -- 4.Substitution and Income Effects -- 4.1.Introduction -- 4.2.Income Changes -- 4.2.1.Using the Derivative of Demand -- 4.2.2.Using Income Elasticity -- 4.2.3.Using the Income-Consumption Curve -- 4.2.4.Using the Engel Curve -- 4.3.Price Changes -- 4.3.1.Using the Derivative of Demand -- 4.3.2.Using the Price-Elasticity of Demand -- 4.3.3.Using Price-Consumption Curves -- 4.4.Income and Substitution Effects -- 4.5.Putting Income and Substitution Effects Together -- 4.5.1.Income and Substitution Effects on the Labor Market -- Appendix A Not All Goods Can Be Inferior -- Appendix B An Alternative Representation of Income and Substitution Effects -- Using Elasticities to Represent the Slutsky Equation -- Exercises -- 5.Measuring Welfare Changes -- 5.1.Introduction -- 5.2.Consumer Surplus -- 5.3.Compensating Variation -- 5.4.Equivalent Variation -- 5.5.Measuring Welfare Changes with No Income Effects -- Appendix. An Alternative Representation of the Compensating and Equivalent Variations -- A.1.Compensating Variation -- A.2.Equivalent Variation -- Exercises -- 6.Choice under Uncertainty -- 6.1.Introduction -- 6.2.Lotteries -- 6.3.Expected Value -- 6.4.Variance -- 6.5.Expected Utility -- 6.6.Risk Attitudes -- 6.6.1.Risk Aversion -- 6.6.2.Risk Loving -- 6.6.3.Risk Neutrality -- 6.7.Measuring Risk -- 6.7.1.Risk Premium -- 6.7.2.Certainty Equivalent -- 6.7.3.Arrow-Pratt Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion -- 6.8.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Nonexpected Utility -- 6.8.1.Weighted Utility -- 6.8.2.Prospect Theory -- Exercises -- 7.Production Functions -- 7.1.Introduction -- 7.2.Production Function -- 7.3.Marginal and Average Product -- 7.4.Relationship between APL and MPL -- 7.5.Isoquants -- 7.6.Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution -- 7.7.Special Types of Production Functions -- 7.7.1.Linear Production Function -- 7.7.2.Fixed-Proportions Production Function -- 7.7.3.Cobb-Douglas Production Function -- 7.7.4.Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production Function -- 7.8.Returns to Scale -- 7.9.Technological Progress -- 7.9.1.Types of Technological Progress -- Appendix A MRTS as the Ratio of Marginal Products -- Appendix B Elasticity of Substitution -- Exercises -- 8.Cost Minimization -- 8.1.Introduction -- 8.2.Isocost Lines -- 8.3.Cost-Minimization Problem -- 8.4.Input Demands -- 8.4.1.Input Demand -- Responses -- 8.5.Cost Functions -- 8.6.Types of Costs -- 8.7.Average and Marginal Cost -- 8.7.1.Output Elasticity to Total Cost -- 8.8.Economies of Scale, Scope, and Experience -- 8.8.1.Economies of Scale -- 8.8.2.Economies of Scope -- 8.8.3.Economies of Experience -- Appendix. Cost-Minimization Problem -- A Lagrangian Analysis -- Exercises -- 9.Partial and General Equilibrium -- 9.1.Introduction -- 9.2.Features of Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 9.3.Profit Maximization Problem -- 9.4.Supply Curves -- 9.4.1.Individual Firm Supply -- 9.4.2.Market Supply -- 9.5.Short-Run Supply Curve -- 9.6.Market Equilibrium -- 9.6.1.Short-Run Equilibrium -- 9.6.2.Long-Run Equilibrium -- 9.7.Producer Surplus -- 9.8.General Equilibrium -- 9.8.1.Equilibrium Prices -- 9.8.2.Efficient Allocations -- 9.8.3.Equilibrium versus Efficiency -- 9.8.4.Adding Production to the Economy -- 9.9.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Market Experiments -- Appendix. Efficient Allocations and Marginal Rate of Substitution -- Exercises -- 10.Monopoly -- 10.1.Introduction -- 10.2.Why Do Monopolies Exist? -- 10.3.The Monopolist's Profit Maximization Problem -- 10.3.1.A Closer Look at Marginal Revenue -- 10.3.2.Solving the Monopolist's Problem -- 10.4.Common Misunderstandings of Monopoly Markets -- 10.5.The Lerner Index and Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule -- 10.6.Multiplant Monopoly -- 10.7.Welfare Analysis under Monopoly -- 10.8.Advertising in Monopoly -- 10.9.Monopsony -- Exercises -- 11.Price Discrimination and Bundling -- 11.1.Introduction -- 11.2.Price Discrimination -- 11.2.1.First-Degree Price Discrimination -- 11.2.2.Second-Degree Price Discrimination -- 11.2.3.Third-Degree Price Discrimination -- 11.3.Bundling -- Exercises -- 12.Simultaneous-Move Games -- 12.1.Introduction -- 12.2.What Is a Game? -- 12.3.Strategic Dominance -- 12.4.Nash Equilibrium -- 12.5.Common Games -- 12.6.Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- 12.6.1.Graphical Representation of Best Responses -- Exercises -- 13.Sequential and Repeated Games -- 13.1.Introduction -- 13.2.Game Trees -- 13.3.Why Don't We Just Find the Nash Equilibrium of the Game Tree? -- 13.4.Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium -- 13.4.1.Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in More Involved Games -- 13.5.Repeated Games -- 13.5.1.Finite Repetitions -- 13.5.2.Infinite Repetitions -- 13.6.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Cooperation in the Experimental Lab? -- Exercises -- 14.Imperfect Competition -- 14.1.Introduction -- 14.2.Measuring Market Power -- 14.3.Models of Imperfect Competition -- 14.3.1.Cournot Model -- Simultaneous Quantity Competition -- 14.3.2.Bertrand Model -- Simultaneous Price Competition -- 14.3.3.Cartels and Collusion -- 14.4.Stackelberg Model -- Sequential Quantity Competition -- 14.5.Product Differentiation -- Appendix. Cournot Model with N Firms -- Exercises -- 15.Games of Incomplete Information and Auctions -- 15.1.Introduction -- 15.2.Extending Nash Equilibria to Games of Incomplete Information -- 15.3.Auctions -- 15.3.1.Auctions as Allocation Mechanisms -- 15.4.Second-Price Auctions -- 15.5.First-Price Auctions -- 15.5.1.Privately Observed Valuations -- 15.5.2.Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price Auctions -- 15.5.3.Extending the First-Price Auction to N Bidders -- 15.5.4.First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders -- 15.6.Efficiency in Auctions -- 15.7.Common-Value Auctions -- 15.8.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Experiments with Auctions -- Appendix. First-Price Auctions in More General Settings -- Exercises -- 16.Contract Theory -- 16.1.Introduction -- 16.2.Moral Hazard -- 16.2.1.Contracts When Effort Is Observable -- 16.2.2.Contracts When Effort Is Unobservable -- 16.2.3.Preventing Moral Hazard -- 16.3.Adverse Selection -- 16.3.1.Market for Lemons -- 16.3.2.Market for Lemons -- Symmetric Information -- 16.3.3.Market for Lemons -- Asymmetric Information -- 16.3.4.Principal-Agent Model -- 16.3.5.Principal-Agent Model -- Symmetric Information -- 16.3.6.Principal-Agent Model -- Asymmetric Information -- 16.3.7.Principal-Agent Model -- Comparing Information Settings -- 16.3.8.Preventing Adverse Selection -- Appendix. Showing That PCH and ICL Hold with Equality -- Exercises -- 17.Externalities and Public Goods -- 17.1.Introduction -- 17.2.Externalities -- 17.2.1.Unregulated Equilibrium -- 17.2.2.Social Optimum -- 17.3.Restoring the Social Optimum -- 17.3.1.Bargaining between the Affected Parties -- 17.3.2.Government Intervention -- 17.4.Public Goods -- 17.4.1.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Public-Good Experiments -- 17.5.Common-Pool Resources -- 17.5.1.Finding Equilibrium Appropriation -- 17.5.2.Common-Pool Resources -- Joint Profit Maximization -- Exercises.

"An intermediate microeconomics textbook geared for students in need of a more hands-on, less rigorous treatment of the material"--

ISBN: 9780262044233

LCCN: 2019053969Subjects--Topical Terms:

182798
Microeconomics.

LC Class. No.: HB172 / .E855 2020

Dewey Class. No.: 338.5

Intermediate microeconomic theory :tools and step-by-step examples /
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245 1 0 $a Intermediate microeconomic theory : $b tools and step-by-step examples / $c Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Muñoz-Garcia.
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505 0 $a Machine generated contents note: 1.Introduction -- 1.1.What Is Microeconomics? -- 1.2.Comparative Statics -- 1.3.Overview of the Book -- 1.3.1.Consumer Theory -- 1.3.2.Production Theory -- 1.3.3.Markets -- Putting Consumers and Producers Together -- 1.3.4.Strategy -- Let's Play Games! -- 1.3.5.Putting Game Theory to Work -- 1.3.6.More Market Failures -- When Markets Work Well and When They Don't -- 2.Consumer Preferences and Utility -- 2.1.Introduction -- 2.2.Bundles -- 2.3.Preferences for Bundles -- 2.3.1.Ranking Bundles with More Units -- 2.3.2.Satiation and Bliss Points -- 2.4.Utility Functions -- 2.5.Marginal Utility -- 2.5.1.Diminishing Marginal Utility -- 2.6.Indifference Curves -- 2.6.1.Properties of Indifference Curves -- 2.7.Marginal Rate of Substitution -- 2.7.1.Diminishing MRS -- 2.8.Special Types of Utility Functions -- 2.8.1.Perfect Substitutes -- 2.8.2.Perfect Complements -- 2.8.3.Cobb-Douglas -- 2.8.4.Quasilinear -- 2.8.5.Stone-Geary -- 2.9.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Social Preferences -- 2.9.1.Fehr-Schmidt Social Preferences -- 2.9.2.Bolton and Ockenfels Social Preferences -- Appendix. Finding the Marginal Rate of Substitution -- Exercises -- 3.Consumer Choice -- 3.1.Introduction -- 3.2.Budget Constraint -- 3.3.Utility Maximization Problem -- 3.4.Utility Maximization Problem in Extreme Scenarios -- 3.5.Revealed Preference -- 3.6.Kinked Budget Lines -- 3.6.1.Quantity Discounts -- 3.6.2.Introducing Coupons -- Appendix A Applying the Lagrange Method to Solve the Utility Maximization Problem -- Appendix B Expenditure Minimization Problem -- Relationship between the Utility Maximization Problem and the Expenditure Minimization Problem -- Exercises -- 4.Substitution and Income Effects -- 4.1.Introduction -- 4.2.Income Changes -- 4.2.1.Using the Derivative of Demand -- 4.2.2.Using Income Elasticity -- 4.2.3.Using the Income-Consumption Curve -- 4.2.4.Using the Engel Curve -- 4.3.Price Changes -- 4.3.1.Using the Derivative of Demand -- 4.3.2.Using the Price-Elasticity of Demand -- 4.3.3.Using Price-Consumption Curves -- 4.4.Income and Substitution Effects -- 4.5.Putting Income and Substitution Effects Together -- 4.5.1.Income and Substitution Effects on the Labor Market -- Appendix A Not All Goods Can Be Inferior -- Appendix B An Alternative Representation of Income and Substitution Effects -- Using Elasticities to Represent the Slutsky Equation -- Exercises -- 5.Measuring Welfare Changes -- 5.1.Introduction -- 5.2.Consumer Surplus -- 5.3.Compensating Variation -- 5.4.Equivalent Variation -- 5.5.Measuring Welfare Changes with No Income Effects -- Appendix. An Alternative Representation of the Compensating and Equivalent Variations -- A.1.Compensating Variation -- A.2.Equivalent Variation -- Exercises -- 6.Choice under Uncertainty -- 6.1.Introduction -- 6.2.Lotteries -- 6.3.Expected Value -- 6.4.Variance -- 6.5.Expected Utility -- 6.6.Risk Attitudes -- 6.6.1.Risk Aversion -- 6.6.2.Risk Loving -- 6.6.3.Risk Neutrality -- 6.7.Measuring Risk -- 6.7.1.Risk Premium -- 6.7.2.Certainty Equivalent -- 6.7.3.Arrow-Pratt Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion -- 6.8.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Nonexpected Utility -- 6.8.1.Weighted Utility -- 6.8.2.Prospect Theory -- Exercises -- 7.Production Functions -- 7.1.Introduction -- 7.2.Production Function -- 7.3.Marginal and Average Product -- 7.4.Relationship between APL and MPL -- 7.5.Isoquants -- 7.6.Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution -- 7.7.Special Types of Production Functions -- 7.7.1.Linear Production Function -- 7.7.2.Fixed-Proportions Production Function -- 7.7.3.Cobb-Douglas Production Function -- 7.7.4.Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production Function -- 7.8.Returns to Scale -- 7.9.Technological Progress -- 7.9.1.Types of Technological Progress -- Appendix A MRTS as the Ratio of Marginal Products -- Appendix B Elasticity of Substitution -- Exercises -- 8.Cost Minimization -- 8.1.Introduction -- 8.2.Isocost Lines -- 8.3.Cost-Minimization Problem -- 8.4.Input Demands -- 8.4.1.Input Demand -- Responses -- 8.5.Cost Functions -- 8.6.Types of Costs -- 8.7.Average and Marginal Cost -- 8.7.1.Output Elasticity to Total Cost -- 8.8.Economies of Scale, Scope, and Experience -- 8.8.1.Economies of Scale -- 8.8.2.Economies of Scope -- 8.8.3.Economies of Experience -- Appendix. Cost-Minimization Problem -- A Lagrangian Analysis -- Exercises -- 9.Partial and General Equilibrium -- 9.1.Introduction -- 9.2.Features of Perfectly Competitive Markets -- 9.3.Profit Maximization Problem -- 9.4.Supply Curves -- 9.4.1.Individual Firm Supply -- 9.4.2.Market Supply -- 9.5.Short-Run Supply Curve -- 9.6.Market Equilibrium -- 9.6.1.Short-Run Equilibrium -- 9.6.2.Long-Run Equilibrium -- 9.7.Producer Surplus -- 9.8.General Equilibrium -- 9.8.1.Equilibrium Prices -- 9.8.2.Efficient Allocations -- 9.8.3.Equilibrium versus Efficiency -- 9.8.4.Adding Production to the Economy -- 9.9.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Market Experiments -- Appendix. Efficient Allocations and Marginal Rate of Substitution -- Exercises -- 10.Monopoly -- 10.1.Introduction -- 10.2.Why Do Monopolies Exist? -- 10.3.The Monopolist's Profit Maximization Problem -- 10.3.1.A Closer Look at Marginal Revenue -- 10.3.2.Solving the Monopolist's Problem -- 10.4.Common Misunderstandings of Monopoly Markets -- 10.5.The Lerner Index and Inverse Elasticity Pricing Rule -- 10.6.Multiplant Monopoly -- 10.7.Welfare Analysis under Monopoly -- 10.8.Advertising in Monopoly -- 10.9.Monopsony -- Exercises -- 11.Price Discrimination and Bundling -- 11.1.Introduction -- 11.2.Price Discrimination -- 11.2.1.First-Degree Price Discrimination -- 11.2.2.Second-Degree Price Discrimination -- 11.2.3.Third-Degree Price Discrimination -- 11.3.Bundling -- Exercises -- 12.Simultaneous-Move Games -- 12.1.Introduction -- 12.2.What Is a Game? -- 12.3.Strategic Dominance -- 12.4.Nash Equilibrium -- 12.5.Common Games -- 12.6.Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- 12.6.1.Graphical Representation of Best Responses -- Exercises -- 13.Sequential and Repeated Games -- 13.1.Introduction -- 13.2.Game Trees -- 13.3.Why Don't We Just Find the Nash Equilibrium of the Game Tree? -- 13.4.Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium -- 13.4.1.Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in More Involved Games -- 13.5.Repeated Games -- 13.5.1.Finite Repetitions -- 13.5.2.Infinite Repetitions -- 13.6.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Cooperation in the Experimental Lab? -- Exercises -- 14.Imperfect Competition -- 14.1.Introduction -- 14.2.Measuring Market Power -- 14.3.Models of Imperfect Competition -- 14.3.1.Cournot Model -- Simultaneous Quantity Competition -- 14.3.2.Bertrand Model -- Simultaneous Price Competition -- 14.3.3.Cartels and Collusion -- 14.4.Stackelberg Model -- Sequential Quantity Competition -- 14.5.Product Differentiation -- Appendix. Cournot Model with N Firms -- Exercises -- 15.Games of Incomplete Information and Auctions -- 15.1.Introduction -- 15.2.Extending Nash Equilibria to Games of Incomplete Information -- 15.3.Auctions -- 15.3.1.Auctions as Allocation Mechanisms -- 15.4.Second-Price Auctions -- 15.5.First-Price Auctions -- 15.5.1.Privately Observed Valuations -- 15.5.2.Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price Auctions -- 15.5.3.Extending the First-Price Auction to N Bidders -- 15.5.4.First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders -- 15.6.Efficiency in Auctions -- 15.7.Common-Value Auctions -- 15.8.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Experiments with Auctions -- Appendix. First-Price Auctions in More General Settings -- Exercises -- 16.Contract Theory -- 16.1.Introduction -- 16.2.Moral Hazard -- 16.2.1.Contracts When Effort Is Observable -- 16.2.2.Contracts When Effort Is Unobservable -- 16.2.3.Preventing Moral Hazard -- 16.3.Adverse Selection -- 16.3.1.Market for Lemons -- 16.3.2.Market for Lemons -- Symmetric Information -- 16.3.3.Market for Lemons -- Asymmetric Information -- 16.3.4.Principal-Agent Model -- 16.3.5.Principal-Agent Model -- Symmetric Information -- 16.3.6.Principal-Agent Model -- Asymmetric Information -- 16.3.7.Principal-Agent Model -- Comparing Information Settings -- 16.3.8.Preventing Adverse Selection -- Appendix. Showing That PCH and ICL Hold with Equality -- Exercises -- 17.Externalities and Public Goods -- 17.1.Introduction -- 17.2.Externalities -- 17.2.1.Unregulated Equilibrium -- 17.2.2.Social Optimum -- 17.3.Restoring the Social Optimum -- 17.3.1.Bargaining between the Affected Parties -- 17.3.2.Government Intervention -- 17.4.Public Goods -- 17.4.1.A Look at Behavioral Economics -- Public-Good Experiments -- 17.5.Common-Pool Resources -- 17.5.1.Finding Equilibrium Appropriation -- 17.5.2.Common-Pool Resources -- Joint Profit Maximization -- Exercises.
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