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The epistemology of religious disagr...

Kraft, James.

The epistemology of religious disagreementa better understanding /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The epistemology of religious disagreementJames Kraft.
其他題名:	a better understanding /
作者:	Kraft, James.
出版者:	New York :Palgrave Macmillan,2012.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (182 p.)
標題:	Knowledge, Theory of (Religion)
電子資源:	http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137015105
ISBN:	9781137015105 (electronic bk.)

The epistemology of religious disagreementa better understanding /
Kraft, James.

The epistemology of religious disagreementa better understanding /[electronic resource] :James Kraft. - 1st ed. - New York :Palgrave Macmillan,2012. - 1 online resource (182 p.)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction -- PART I: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ORDINARY DISAGREEMENTS -- Justified True Belief? -- Justified True Belief -- Two Challenges to the Need for Justification -- The Gettier Problem -- The No-false-ground Solution -- Greco and Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology -- Fallibilism, Obliviousness, and Anxiety -- Defeasibility, Causality, and Anti-luck Solutions -- Problems for Internalism and Externalism -- Recapitulation of Gettier Wisdom -- Varieties of Luck and Possible Worlds -- Gettier Luck and Beginner's Luck -- Truth-tracking, Safety, and Truth-tethering -- Hetherington's Criticism of Counterfactual Robustness -- An Adequate Tether Luckily Employed -- Lotteries and Farther Out Luck -- Factors for Determining Nearness -- Using Daedalus Analogy -- Reflection and Resolution Luck, and Stubbornness -- Skepticism between Beginner's and Lottery Luck -- The Ormulation of the Problem -- Possible Worlds and Counterfactuals -- Between Beginner's Luck and Lottery Luck -- Responses to Skepticism -- Ordinary Disagreements -- What Disagreements do -- Epistemic Peer -- Higher and Lower Order Evidences -- No Reduction Needed -- The Social Challenge -- Conservatism and its Frustrater -- Challenges due to Relevant Symmetries -- Value Added by Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Analysis -- Symmetries Generate Relevant Error Possibilities? -- Epistemic Peer Reduction -- PART II: FROM ORDINARY TO RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENTS -- Ordinary and Religious Disagreements Compared -- Differences -- Religious Experience, Cultural Contingency, and Fallibility -- Religious Testimony, Miracles, Scripture, and Repeatability -- 'If she were raised in India, she would be Hindu!' -- Similarities -- Need for Support, a Tether -- Religious and Skeptical Disagreements -- The Tether, its Limitations, and Tensility -- Exclusivism, Pluralism, Postmodernism, Contextualism, and Hermeneutics -- Neutral Approaches to Religious Diversity -- Exclusivism -- Pluralism -- Non-Neutral Approaches to Religious Diversity -- Postmodernism -- Contextualism -- Hermeneutics -- Non-Reductive Religious Disagreement -- Alston's Non-neutral Worst Case Scenario -- Exclusivist Non-reduction -- Plantinga's Response to 'I believe just because of the way raised' -- Internalist Non-reductive Positions -- Rock-bottom Beliefs -- Reduction -- Non-neutral Refutation Responses -- Non-neutral Refutation Responses, General -- Pragmatic Inertia as Refutation -- Pluralism as a Refutation Response -- Externalist Detour Strategies -- Unshakeable Externalist Intuitions -- Internalist Detour Strategies -- Resignation -- Varieties of Resignation, especially Liminal and Contextualist -- Conclusion.

The opponent in either an ordinary or religious disagreement asserts you have made a mistake. To avoid mistakes we strive to have good justification for beliefs which holds us connected to them during difficult challenges, similar to how a good boat tether, pictured on this book's front cover, holds a valuable boat throughout the many stresses placed on it. The problem is that an equivalently informed and capable opponent shows a possible mistake as relevant, and this ought to reduce confidence in the justification of the religious belief. The book develops, by looking at foundational issues in the theory of knowledge, an understanding of justification specifically designed to describe best exactly why this reduction happens.

ISBN: 9781137015105 (electronic bk.)

Source: 580485Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Topical Terms:

268651
Knowledge, Theory of (Religion)
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

214472
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: BL51 / .K667 2012

Dewey Class. No.: 212/.6

The epistemology of religious disagreementa better understanding /
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505 0 $a Introduction -- PART I: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ORDINARY DISAGREEMENTS -- Justified True Belief? -- Justified True Belief -- Two Challenges to the Need for Justification -- The Gettier Problem -- The No-false-ground Solution -- Greco and Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology -- Fallibilism, Obliviousness, and Anxiety -- Defeasibility, Causality, and Anti-luck Solutions -- Problems for Internalism and Externalism -- Recapitulation of Gettier Wisdom -- Varieties of Luck and Possible Worlds -- Gettier Luck and Beginner's Luck -- Truth-tracking, Safety, and Truth-tethering -- Hetherington's Criticism of Counterfactual Robustness -- An Adequate Tether Luckily Employed -- Lotteries and Farther Out Luck -- Factors for Determining Nearness -- Using Daedalus Analogy -- Reflection and Resolution Luck, and Stubbornness -- Skepticism between Beginner's and Lottery Luck -- The Ormulation of the Problem -- Possible Worlds and Counterfactuals -- Between Beginner's Luck and Lottery Luck -- Responses to Skepticism -- Ordinary Disagreements -- What Disagreements do -- Epistemic Peer -- Higher and Lower Order Evidences -- No Reduction Needed -- The Social Challenge -- Conservatism and its Frustrater -- Challenges due to Relevant Symmetries -- Value Added by Possible Worlds and Counterfactual Analysis -- Symmetries Generate Relevant Error Possibilities? -- Epistemic Peer Reduction -- PART II: FROM ORDINARY TO RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENTS -- Ordinary and Religious Disagreements Compared -- Differences -- Religious Experience, Cultural Contingency, and Fallibility -- Religious Testimony, Miracles, Scripture, and Repeatability -- 'If she were raised in India, she would be Hindu!' -- Similarities -- Need for Support, a Tether -- Religious and Skeptical Disagreements -- The Tether, its Limitations, and Tensility -- Exclusivism, Pluralism, Postmodernism, Contextualism, and Hermeneutics -- Neutral Approaches to Religious Diversity -- Exclusivism -- Pluralism -- Non-Neutral Approaches to Religious Diversity -- Postmodernism -- Contextualism -- Hermeneutics -- Non-Reductive Religious Disagreement -- Alston's Non-neutral Worst Case Scenario -- Exclusivist Non-reduction -- Plantinga's Response to 'I believe just because of the way raised' -- Internalist Non-reductive Positions -- Rock-bottom Beliefs -- Reduction -- Non-neutral Refutation Responses -- Non-neutral Refutation Responses, General -- Pragmatic Inertia as Refutation -- Pluralism as a Refutation Response -- Externalist Detour Strategies -- Unshakeable Externalist Intuitions -- Internalist Detour Strategies -- Resignation -- Varieties of Resignation, especially Liminal and Contextualist -- Conclusion.
520 $a The opponent in either an ordinary or religious disagreement asserts you have made a mistake. To avoid mistakes we strive to have good justification for beliefs which holds us connected to them during difficult challenges, similar to how a good boat tether, pictured on this book's front cover, holds a valuable boat throughout the many stresses placed on it. The problem is that an equivalently informed and capable opponent shows a possible mistake as relevant, and this ought to reduce confidence in the justification of the religious belief. The book develops, by looking at foundational issues in the theory of knowledge, an understanding of justification specifically designed to describe best exactly why this reduction happens.
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