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Government formation in multi-level ...

Stefuriuc, Irina.

Government formation in multi-level settingsparty strategy and institutional constraints /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Government formation in multi-level settingsIrina Stefuriuc.
其他題名:	party strategy and institutional constraints /
作者:	Stefuriuc, Irina.
出版者:	Houndmills, Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan,[2013]
面頁冊數:	1 online resource.
標題:	Coalition governments.
電子資源:	http://www.palgraveconnect.com/doifinder/10.1057/9781137300744
ISBN:	9781137300744 (electronic bk.)

Government formation in multi-level settingsparty strategy and institutional constraints /
Stefuriuc, Irina.

Government formation in multi-level settingsparty strategy and institutional constraints /[electronic resource] :Irina Stefuriuc. - Houndmills, Basingstoke :Palgrave Macmillan,[2013] - 1 online resource. - Comparative territorial politics series. - Comparative territorial politics series..

Includes bibliographical references.

Towards a theory of coalition formation in multi-level settings -- Research design concepts, methods and country selection -- Multi-level polities institutions, decision-making, parties & party systems -- Regional coalition governments in Spain and Germany a statistical exploration -- Subnational coalition formation as a multi-level game -- Coalition formation the process -- Conclusions: subnational coalition formation in multi-level settings.

To step in government at only one level or to stay in opposition at both? To opt for a single consistent strategy or to try out various, but sometimes conflicting, formulae? To replicate coalition agreements at the federal level or to adapt them to the regional context, even if this means departing from a coherent party line? These are just some of the many questions that political parties face when attempting to form a successful coalition in multi-level polities. Through the example of Germany and Spain Dr. Stefuriuc seeks to explore how political parties form coalitions at the subnational level and in doing so develops a strong theoretical framework that revises existing models of government formation and creates explanations based on the multi-level institutional context. This excellent contribution to the subject is important reading for students and scholars of Comparative European Politics, Federalism, decentralization and Multi-level Governance.

ISBN: 9781137300744 (electronic bk.)

Source: 507996Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Topical Terms:

292306
Coalition governments.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

214472
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: JF331 / .S74 2013

Dewey Class. No.: 324

Government formation in multi-level settingsparty strategy and institutional constraints /
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