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A philosophy of person and identitywhere was I when I wasn't there? /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A philosophy of person and identityby Monica Meijsing.
其他題名:	where was I when I wasn't there? /
作者:	Meijsing, Monica.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2022.
面頁冊數:	ix, 183 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Philosophy of mind.
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5
ISBN:	9783031095245$q(electronic bk.)

A philosophy of person and identitywhere was I when I wasn't there? /
Meijsing, Monica.

A philosophy of person and identitywhere was I when I wasn't there? /[electronic resource] :by Monica Meijsing. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2022. - ix, 183 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Studies in brain and mind,v. 212468-399X ;. - Studies in brain and mind ;v.6..

Chapter 1. Where was I? What am I? -- chapter 2. Life and Death, Soul and Body -- Chapter 3. Consciousness, Person and Self -- Chapter 4. Cartesian People 1: The Body a Machine -- Chapter 5. Cartesian People 2: The Body an Illusion -- Chapter 6. Lockean Persons 1. Living Without Memory -- Chapter 7. Lockean Persons 2. Persons and Organisms -- Chapter 8. The Gradual Origin of Self-Consciousness -- Chapter 9. Here I am.

This book discusses the themes of personhood and personal identity. It argues that while there is a metaphysical answer to the question of personal identity, there is no metaphysical answer to the question of what constitutes a person. The author argues against both body-mind dualism and physicalism and also against the idea that there is some metaphysically real category of persons distinct from the category of human beings or human organisms. Instead, the author presents neutral-monist, autopoietic-enactivist kind of metaphysics of the human being, and a relational, and completely human-dependent notion of a person. The tools used in these arguments include conceptual argumentation and empirical case studies. Using both personal experiences and studies of cultures all over the world, the author examines dualism between mind and body. The author discusses real people who seem to live a Cartesian life, as somehow disembodied minds as well as the concept of the person. The author uses the concluding chapters to present their own views arguing that questions about our identity should be separated from questions of our personhood as well as the concept of personhood. This volume is of interest to scholars of philosophy of mind.

ISBN: 9783031095245$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

178358
Philosophy of mind.

LC Class. No.: BD418.3

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

A philosophy of person and identitywhere was I when I wasn't there? /
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