國立高雄大學圖資館 |

登入

回首頁

Reallocation in Perishable Goods Markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Reallocation in Perishable Goods Markets.
作者:	Vollmer, Andrew.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021
面頁冊數:	158 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.
附註:	Advisor: Roberts, James.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-12A.
標題:	Finance.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28319516
ISBN:	9798738631399

Reallocation in Perishable Goods Markets.
Vollmer, Andrew.

Reallocation in Perishable Goods Markets. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 158 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

How does the ability to reallocate affect perishable goods markets? I study how the effects on consumers and a monopolist seller vary depending on whether resale or refund contracts are used to reallocate and whether the setting features demand uncertainty or price discrimination.In Chapter 2, I study the performance of popular reallocation mechanisms in the market for college football tickets, which features several sources of uncertainty. I show that the performance of each mechanism depends on the properties of demand uncertainty and build a model in which consumers anticipate shocks, make advance purchase decisions, and reallocate after shocks are realized. By capturing the effects of different types of shocks, the model is able to predict the relative performance of the mechanisms. I find that refund contracts produce higher profit and total welfare than resale because of fees and frictions associated with resale.In Chapter 3, I use a theory model with advance purchases and a rich set of idiosyncratic demand shocks to compare the performance of resale and refunds. For profit, the relative performance depends on the degree of aggregate uncertainty, and the seller can completely insulate itself against aggregate uncertainty by owning the resale market and selling to brokers. Aggregate uncertainty enhances the performance of resale because resale prices adjust to reflect shocks while the monopolist seller's prices do not. For welfare, both the seller and a monopolist resale market operator have an incentive to impede frictionless resale, and either can maximize welfare.In Chapter 4, I consider how the ability to resell affects a monopolist's incentive to bundle. Using a model in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over two goods and a cost of participating in a resale market, I show that the monopolist may choose to bundle even if some consumers resell. The coexistence of price discrimination and resale is novel in settings where resale harms the seller, and I show that it significantly affects the monopolist's pricing problem.

ISBN: 9798738631399Subjects--Topical Terms:

183252
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Consumption

Reallocation in Perishable Goods Markets.
LDR:03264nmm a2200397 4500 001 616397
005 20220513114326.5
008 220920s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798738631399
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28319516
035 $a AAI28319516
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Vollmer, Andrew. $3 915576
245 1 0 $a Reallocation in Perishable Goods Markets.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 158 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Roberts, James.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a How does the ability to reallocate affect perishable goods markets? I study how the effects on consumers and a monopolist seller vary depending on whether resale or refund contracts are used to reallocate and whether the setting features demand uncertainty or price discrimination.In Chapter 2, I study the performance of popular reallocation mechanisms in the market for college football tickets, which features several sources of uncertainty. I show that the performance of each mechanism depends on the properties of demand uncertainty and build a model in which consumers anticipate shocks, make advance purchase decisions, and reallocate after shocks are realized. By capturing the effects of different types of shocks, the model is able to predict the relative performance of the mechanisms. I find that refund contracts produce higher profit and total welfare than resale because of fees and frictions associated with resale.In Chapter 3, I use a theory model with advance purchases and a rich set of idiosyncratic demand shocks to compare the performance of resale and refunds. For profit, the relative performance depends on the degree of aggregate uncertainty, and the seller can completely insulate itself against aggregate uncertainty by owning the resale market and selling to brokers. Aggregate uncertainty enhances the performance of resale because resale prices adjust to reflect shocks while the monopolist seller's prices do not. For welfare, both the seller and a monopolist resale market operator have an incentive to impede frictionless resale, and either can maximize welfare.In Chapter 4, I consider how the ability to resell affects a monopolist's incentive to bundle. Using a model in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over two goods and a cost of participating in a resale market, I show that the monopolist may choose to bundle even if some consumers resell. The coexistence of price discrimination and resale is novel in settings where resale harms the seller, and I show that it significantly affects the monopolist's pricing problem.
590 $a School code: 0066.
650 4 $a Finance. $3 183252
653 $a Consumption
653 $a Monopolies
653 $a Resale and refund contracts
653 $a Demand uncertainty
653 $a Price discrimination
653 $a Demand shocks
653 $a Bundling
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a Duke University. $b Economics. $3 660275
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 82-12A.
790 $a 0066
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28319516