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The construction of the rule of law in nascent democracies :Judicial autonomy in Latin America.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The construction of the rule of law in nascent democracies :
Reminder of title:	Judicial autonomy in Latin America.
Author:	Chavez, Rebecca Bill.
Description:	372 p.
Notes:	Advisers: Terry Lynn Karl; Larry Diamond.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-09, Section: A, page: 3168.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International62-09A.
Subject:	Political Science, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3026786
ISBN:	049338197X

The construction of the rule of law in nascent democracies :Judicial autonomy in Latin America.
Chavez, Rebecca Bill.

The construction of the rule of law in nascent democracies :Judicial autonomy in Latin America.[electronic resource] - 372 p.

Advisers: Terry Lynn Karl; Larry Diamond.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2001.

This study explores how nascent democracies construct the rule of law. It argues that the balanced dispersal of political power is a necessary condition for the rule of law. Political parties are a key mechanism for the fragmentation of political power. The rule of law results in part from a balance of power between at least two political parties, neither of which sustains monolithic control, meaning that no highly disciplined party sustains control of both the legislative and executive branches. Party balance and low party discipline create a climate in which a system of overlapping horizontal accountability agencies can emerge. When political power is dispersed, the executive is unable to obstruct such a system and may even see advantages in creating agencies with the autonomy and resources necessary to control the abuse of power. To provide a complete story about how emerging democracies can build a rule of law, this study also addresses patterns of power in the economic and societal realms. Balanced distribution of economic resources among a divided elite is one path to the requisite dispersal of political power. Where institutional power and economic power converge, a reform coalition of civil society actors allied with key international actors can gradually overcome monopolies in the political realm. These theoretical propositions are supported by a diachronic study of Argentina at the federal level along with a synchronic comparison of two Argentine provinces, San Luis and Mendoza.

ISBN: 049338197XSubjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

The construction of the rule of law in nascent democracies :Judicial autonomy in Latin America.
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