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Dynamics of multi-candidate elections :Menu-dependent preferences

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Dynamics of multi-candidate elections :
Reminder of title:	Menu-dependent preferences
Author:	Levine, Renan.
Description:	363 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-04, Section: A, page: 1524.
Notes:	Supervisor: John H. Aldrich.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-04A.
Subject:	Political Science, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3129067
ISBN:	049676327X

Dynamics of multi-candidate elections :Menu-dependent preferences
Levine, Renan.

Dynamics of multi-candidate elections :Menu-dependent preferences [electronic resource] - 363 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-04, Section: A, page: 1524.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2003.

How are multicandidate elections different from elections with only two candidates? Are concerns that minor party candidates confuse or distract voters valid? Using original experiments, I investigate how the presence of more than two options affects the vote. Contrary to traditional vote models, I find that the number and type of candidates in an election campaign influence voter decision-making in systematic ways. In comparison to certain competitors, candidates will appear closer or farther to the median voter. When there are more than two candidates, I find a compromise effect that benefits moderate candidates consistent with scholarship into consumer behavior. Voters who find the voting decision to be difficult are more likely to choose the moderate candidate regardless of strategic considerations. When a third, extreme candidate is in the race, the adjacent candidate benefits from appearing more moderate and wins the vote of some who might otherwise support the opposing candidate.

ISBN: 049676327XSubjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

Dynamics of multi-candidate elections :Menu-dependent preferences
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520 # $a How are multicandidate elections different from elections with only two candidates? Are concerns that minor party candidates confuse or distract voters valid? Using original experiments, I investigate how the presence of more than two options affects the vote. Contrary to traditional vote models, I find that the number and type of candidates in an election campaign influence voter decision-making in systematic ways. In comparison to certain competitors, candidates will appear closer or farther to the median voter. When there are more than two candidates, I find a compromise effect that benefits moderate candidates consistent with scholarship into consumer behavior. Voters who find the voting decision to be difficult are more likely to choose the moderate candidate regardless of strategic considerations. When a third, extreme candidate is in the race, the adjacent candidate benefits from appearing more moderate and wins the vote of some who might otherwise support the opposing candidate.
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