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The domestic politics of internation...

Major, Solomon.

The domestic politics of international economic sanctions.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The domestic politics of international economic sanctions.
Author:	Major, Solomon.
Description:	314 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Judith Goldstein.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-11, Section: A, page: 4335.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International65-11A.
Subject:	Political Science, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3153072
ISBN:	9780496135189

The domestic politics of international economic sanctions.
Major, Solomon.

The domestic politics of international economic sanctions. - 314 p.

Adviser: Judith Goldstein.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.

Beginning with the insight that policies are the result of bargaining games played within the target state, this dissertation argues that sanctions must upset the political equilibrium that gave rise to the policies deemed offensive by the sender(s). A model is introduced that shows how this may be accomplished through the use of economic coercion. Such a strategy relies on focusing advocates of the policy status quo to reduce their support of their preferred policies, while encouraging opposition groups to increase lobbying in favor of their own policy preferences. According to the model, the resulting change in lobbying should result in a policy shift in favor of the sending country(s).

ISBN: 9780496135189Subjects--Topical Terms:

212408
Political Science, General.

The domestic politics of international economic sanctions.
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100 0 $a Major, Solomon. $3 244598
245 1 4 $a The domestic politics of international economic sanctions.
300 $a 314 p.
500 $a Adviser: Judith Goldstein.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 65-11, Section: A, page: 4335.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.
520 # $a Beginning with the insight that policies are the result of bargaining games played within the target state, this dissertation argues that sanctions must upset the political equilibrium that gave rise to the policies deemed offensive by the sender(s). A model is introduced that shows how this may be accomplished through the use of economic coercion. Such a strategy relies on focusing advocates of the policy status quo to reduce their support of their preferred policies, while encouraging opposition groups to increase lobbying in favor of their own policy preferences. According to the model, the resulting change in lobbying should result in a policy shift in favor of the sending country(s).
520 # $a In order to test the plausibility of the model's key claims, two case studies are advanced as "plausibility probes": China v. the US and The World Community v. South Africa, respectively. Evidence from each of these cases supports the plausibility of the model introduced here though, as noted in the conclusion, definitive proof awaits further empirical investigation.
520 # $a Surprisingly, the model also shows that the groups most efficiently targeted by sanctions will be "innocent bystanders"---those who had not lobbied for or against the policies in question prior to the sanctions being imposed---as opposed to the "elites" that have generally been held to be the best targets of sanctions thus far. This finding hinges upon the observation that, given diminishing marginal returns to lobbying , formerly uncommitted groups will tend to have the largest marginal impact on policy. This finding is subject to a number of institutional and economic factors explored at length below.
520 # $a This dissertation seeks to develop a more through and rigorous theory of international economic sanctions and coercion by analyzing the effect that sanctions have on political economy of the target state.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 # 0 $a Political Science, General. $3 212408
650 # 0 $a Political Science, International Law and Relations. $3 212542
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790 1 0 $a Goldstein, Judith, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
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