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Leviathan or agile state? Strategie...

Aldrich, Daniel Peter-Daum.

Leviathan or agile state? Strategies and tool kits for siting public bads (Japan, France, United States).

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Leviathan or agile state? Strategies and tool kits for siting public bads (Japan, France, United States).
Author:	Aldrich, Daniel Peter-Daum.
Description:	399 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Susan J. Pharr.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1480.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-04A.
Subject:	Energy.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3173843
ISBN:	9780542112386

Leviathan or agile state? Strategies and tool kits for siting public bads (Japan, France, United States).
Aldrich, Daniel Peter-Daum.

Leviathan or agile state? Strategies and tool kits for siting public bads (Japan, France, United States). - 399 p.

Adviser: Susan J. Pharr.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.

Finally, bureaus will be most adaptive, innovative, and flexible when highly professional civil servants encounter acute and persistent contestation. When a semi-professional state agency engages weak or short-lived opposition, it is more likely to remain with existing policies and tactics. Precisely because toolkits are partially a function of contestation, there is a strong correlation between adaptive state responses and the use of preference-altering policy instruments which seek to capture the hearts and minds of local citizens. I provide quantitative evidence using panel data on 500 municipalities in Japan along with qualitative support grounded in four historical-institutional case studies of Japan, France, and the United States. My thesis draws on two years of fieldwork in Japan and France involving archival research, visits to "host" communities, and interviews with more than 100 political elites.

ISBN: 9780542112386Subjects--Topical Terms:

212397
Energy.

Leviathan or agile state? Strategies and tool kits for siting public bads (Japan, France, United States).
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245 1 0 $a Leviathan or agile state? Strategies and tool kits for siting public bads (Japan, France, United States).
300 $a 399 p.
500 $a Adviser: Susan J. Pharr.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-04, Section: A, page: 1480.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.
520 # $a Finally, bureaus will be most adaptive, innovative, and flexible when highly professional civil servants encounter acute and persistent contestation. When a semi-professional state agency engages weak or short-lived opposition, it is more likely to remain with existing policies and tactics. Precisely because toolkits are partially a function of contestation, there is a strong correlation between adaptive state responses and the use of preference-altering policy instruments which seek to capture the hearts and minds of local citizens. I provide quantitative evidence using panel data on 500 municipalities in Japan along with qualitative support grounded in four historical-institutional case studies of Japan, France, and the United States. My thesis draws on two years of fieldwork in Japan and France involving archival research, visits to "host" communities, and interviews with more than 100 political elites.
520 # $a The ways in which states handle conflict with civil society over highly divisive issues remains a crucial but poorly understood issue. Few public decisions stir more controversy than siting nuclear power plants and other local "public bads." Yet some governments adapt and innovate in the face of such conflicts, while others with similar resources fail to do so. Focusing on the siting dilemmas involving nuclear reactors, dams, and airports, my dissertation explains the pattern of state response to political contention over controversial facility siting.
520 # $a This study advances three interlocking and sequenced arguments. First, state agencies initially manage conflict over controversial facilities by avoiding contestation wherever possible. Despite claims to the contrary, state bureaucracies do not site controversial facilities solely using neutral technical criteria, but rather according to a political logic, locating facilities where local resistance is lowest. By selecting villages likely to be cooperative in the process, the state agency avoids costly delays, demonstrations, and uproar. My second argument is that when handling resistance from contentious civil society, state agencies are more likely to use coercive tools when the project's time horizon is short and it encounters small, isolated opposition. When facing larger groups and projects with long time horizons, bureaucracies tend to employ social control strategies involving pay-offs and persuasion.
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
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