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Institutional signaling and the Cold...

Duke University.

Institutional signaling and the Cold War.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Institutional signaling and the Cold War.
Author:	Weinberger, Seth Harold.
Description:	276 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-06, Section: A, page: 2379.
Notes:	Supervisor: Robert O. Keohane.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-06A.
Subject:	Political Science, International Law and Relations.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3179335
ISBN:	9780542192609

Institutional signaling and the Cold War.
Weinberger, Seth Harold.

Institutional signaling and the Cold War. - 276 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-06, Section: A, page: 2379.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duke University, 2005.

By looking at multiple institutional "offers" occurring during three pivotal periods of the Cold War when Soviet preferences seemed in flux---immediately following World War II, the period of detente, and the end of the Cold War---it will be demonstrated how policy makers within the United States used international institutions to refine their assessments and shift their opinions of Soviet preferences. It is argued that international institutions played a critical role in enabling U.S. policy makers to move from viewing the USSR as a potential partner for peace and cooperation to seeing the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy bent on the expansion of Communism and world domination, and how they eventually returned to the belief that the Soviets were in fact serious about reaching peaceful accommodation.

ISBN: 9780542192609Subjects--Topical Terms:

212542
Political Science, International Law and Relations.

Institutional signaling and the Cold War.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-06, Section: A, page: 2379.
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520 # $a By looking at multiple institutional "offers" occurring during three pivotal periods of the Cold War when Soviet preferences seemed in flux---immediately following World War II, the period of detente, and the end of the Cold War---it will be demonstrated how policy makers within the United States used international institutions to refine their assessments and shift their opinions of Soviet preferences. It is argued that international institutions played a critical role in enabling U.S. policy makers to move from viewing the USSR as a potential partner for peace and cooperation to seeing the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy bent on the expansion of Communism and world domination, and how they eventually returned to the belief that the Soviets were in fact serious about reaching peaceful accommodation.
520 # $a International institutions can serve a valuable role in this problem, as they have a unique ability to impose costs upon states. Institutional structures involve differing levels of costs, as a result of compliance with institutional requirements or from internalization of new norms. Additionally, institutions can create standards of behavior against which the actions of a state can be judged. Institutions maybe able to send credible signals of preference, because they reveal and affect the very nature of the state: its domestic structures, political arrangements, and intentions.
520 # $a States trapped in the security dilemma of international politics need mechanisms by which they can credibly and clearly transmit their preferences to one another. Whether a state is trying to issue a deterrent threat or convince another state that it is trustworthy, every state needs some way to communicate with other states. In an anarchic system with no means of contractual enforcement, receiving and interpreting of signals of intention becomes difficult. When signals lack cost, they lack meaning, as deception becomes easy. Attaching cost to international signals is not an easy task, especially when the signal is intended to convey a state's fundamental preferences to others.
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