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Status inconsistency and strategic b...

Kang, Jeong-Han.

Status inconsistency and strategic behavior in economic markets.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Status inconsistency and strategic behavior in economic markets.
Author:	Kang, Jeong-Han.
Description:	118 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Edward O. Laumann.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1920.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
Subject:	Economics, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219538
ISBN:	9780542710810

Status inconsistency and strategic behavior in economic markets.
Kang, Jeong-Han.

Status inconsistency and strategic behavior in economic markets. - 118 p.

Adviser: Edward O. Laumann.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2006.

This study shows the directional effect of status inconsistency on strategic risk-taking among NASCAR racing teams and on deviant investment strategies among U.S. venture capital (VC) firms. (1) NASCAR is characterized by clearly defined one-dimensional rank competition among racing teams. Built on theories of reference group and competitive status consciousness; I show that objective status falling behind subjective reference status increases racing teams' risk-taking strategy. The reference status can be either cross-sectional (others' higher present status) or longitudinal (one's higher past status). The other direction of inconsistency, i.e., when objective status is higher than reference status, does not have an effect. (2) Status among VC firms emerges from co-investment interactions, where multiple dimensions of status are formed: leadership-based status and partnership-based status. My theoretical integration of status inconsistency and social exchange hypothesizes and confirms that primary status (e.g., leadership for VC firms) being lower than secondary status (e.g., partnership for VC firms) causes deviation from the majority. The other direction of inconsistency, or primary status higher than secondary status, does not lead to deviant strategies. (3) I observe that the variation of risk-taking across longitudinal stages of status formation (in NASCAR) or that of deviance across multiple dimensions of status (in VC) is larger in the middle of the status distribution. This middle-status variation in strategic behavior is largely explained by the effect of status inconsistency discovered in NASCAR or VC. (4) I propose four forms of organizational behavior at the intersection of inertia (vs. change) and normative (vs. deviant): innovative (deviant change), reformative (normative change), conservative (normative inertia), and reactionary (deviant inertia) in the order of the life-course of an organizational form.

ISBN: 9780542710810Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Status inconsistency and strategic behavior in economic markets.
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245 1 0 $a Status inconsistency and strategic behavior in economic markets.
300 $a 118 p.
500 $a Adviser: Edward O. Laumann.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1920.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2006.
520 # $a This study shows the directional effect of status inconsistency on strategic risk-taking among NASCAR racing teams and on deviant investment strategies among U.S. venture capital (VC) firms. (1) NASCAR is characterized by clearly defined one-dimensional rank competition among racing teams. Built on theories of reference group and competitive status consciousness; I show that objective status falling behind subjective reference status increases racing teams' risk-taking strategy. The reference status can be either cross-sectional (others' higher present status) or longitudinal (one's higher past status). The other direction of inconsistency, i.e., when objective status is higher than reference status, does not have an effect. (2) Status among VC firms emerges from co-investment interactions, where multiple dimensions of status are formed: leadership-based status and partnership-based status. My theoretical integration of status inconsistency and social exchange hypothesizes and confirms that primary status (e.g., leadership for VC firms) being lower than secondary status (e.g., partnership for VC firms) causes deviation from the majority. The other direction of inconsistency, or primary status higher than secondary status, does not lead to deviant strategies. (3) I observe that the variation of risk-taking across longitudinal stages of status formation (in NASCAR) or that of deviance across multiple dimensions of status (in VC) is larger in the middle of the status distribution. This middle-status variation in strategic behavior is largely explained by the effect of status inconsistency discovered in NASCAR or VC. (4) I propose four forms of organizational behavior at the intersection of inertia (vs. change) and normative (vs. deviant): innovative (deviant change), reformative (normative change), conservative (normative inertia), and reactionary (deviant inertia) in the order of the life-course of an organizational form.
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