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Three essays on empirical applicatio...
~
The University of Chicago.
Three essays on empirical applications of contract theory.
Record Type:
Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:
Three essays on empirical applications of contract theory.
Author:
Tseng, Hsin-yu.
Description:
131 p.
Notes:
Advisers: Steven Levitt; Alvin H. Baum.
Notes:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1843.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International67-05A.
Subject:
Economics, General.
Online resource:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219594
ISBN:
9780542711718
Three essays on empirical applications of contract theory.
Tseng, Hsin-yu.
Three essays on empirical applications of contract theory.
- 131 p.
Advisers: Steven Levitt; Alvin H. Baum.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2006.
Chapter 2 examines the incentive effect of a two-year suicide exclusion in individual life insurance policies. The findings suggest that suicide rates quadruple after the exclusion period and that suicides during the exclusion period are often disguised as accidental deaths. The results match the implications of the theory of asymmetric information and suggest that economic considerations affect the timing and method of committing suicide.
ISBN: 9780542711718Subjects--Topical Terms:
212429
Economics, General.
Three essays on empirical applications of contract theory.
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Tseng, Hsin-yu.
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Three essays on empirical applications of contract theory.
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131 p.
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Advisers: Steven Levitt; Alvin H. Baum.
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Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-05, Section: A, page: 1843.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2006.
520
#
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Chapter 2 examines the incentive effect of a two-year suicide exclusion in individual life insurance policies. The findings suggest that suicide rates quadruple after the exclusion period and that suicides during the exclusion period are often disguised as accidental deaths. The results match the implications of the theory of asymmetric information and suggest that economic considerations affect the timing and method of committing suicide.
520
#
$a
Chapter 3 investigates the productivity effect of the 1953 land ownership transfer program in Taiwan where fixed-rental contracts predominated. This program transferred 27% of Taiwan's paddy land to incumbent tenants and was followed by exceptional agricultural performance. However, my findings suggest that when other factors affecting agricultural productivity are accounted for, this program actually had statistically insignificant causal effects on productivity. This result matches the implication of the theory of incentives and risk sharing.
520
#
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I find that whether people face the risk of becoming uninsured depends on their insurance status. In the group market, sick people do not lose coverage. Yet, in the individual market, sick people do lose coverage. Being high-risk for two or more years increases the likelihood of losing coverage. I also find that price restrictions result in an adverse selection effect leading low-risk policyholders to drop out of the individual market. These findings imply an ex-ante welfare loss and a coverage tradeoff between regimes with and without price restrictions.
520
#
$a
The theme of my dissertation research is empirical applications of contract theory. I apply the theory to three distinct markets: the health insurance, the life insurance, and the land rental market. In chapter 1 of this dissertation, I examine whether people face the risk of losing health insurance coverage if they get sick. I also examine whether price restrictions lead healthy people to drop out of the health insurance market. To reduce the risk of losing coverage, states implement price restrictions that limit price differentials between high- and low-risk policyholders in the individual market. This limit may cause low-risk policyholders to drop out of the market since they pay a higher premium rate, and their rate may go up more.
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Economics, General.
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The University of Chicago.
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Baum, Alvin H.,
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advisor
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Levitt, Steven,
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advisor
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Ph.D.
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2006
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http://libsw.nuk.edu.tw:81/login?url=http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219594
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http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3219594
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