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Empirical analyses of decision-makin...

McBride, Stephan D.

Empirical analyses of decision-making in Anglo-Norman legal cases.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Empirical analyses of decision-making in Anglo-Norman legal cases.
Author:	McBride, Stephan D.
Description:	313 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Avner Greif.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 1921.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-05A.
Subject:	Law.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3313620
ISBN:	9780549623816

Empirical analyses of decision-making in Anglo-Norman legal cases.
McBride, Stephan D.

Empirical analyses of decision-making in Anglo-Norman legal cases. - 313 p.

Adviser: Avner Greif.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.

The first study analyzes how the use of decentralized decision making by collections of barons responded to changes in relative royal power and social relations during the Norman period. This paper estimates a discrete choice model for the use of decentralized decision making using all major legal cases to measure how relative royal power affected the adjudication method. Norman England is an ideal case study because disputes were tried openly before the assembled king and barons, introducing power dynamics and social relations into the deliberations over the case outcome. There are two main results. First, enhanced royal power diminished the use of decentralized decision making because of an increased capacity to administer justice without baronial involvement, consistent with the Administrative Capacity Theory of Greif (2007). Second, use of decentralized decision making diminished as baronial coordination became more difficult and increased when the threat of royal predation rose.

ISBN: 9780549623816Subjects--Topical Terms:

207600
Law.

Empirical analyses of decision-making in Anglo-Norman legal cases.
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100 $a McBride, Stephan D. $3 321807
245 1 0 $a Empirical analyses of decision-making in Anglo-Norman legal cases.
300 $a 313 p.
500 $a Adviser: Avner Greif.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 1921.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.
520 $a The first study analyzes how the use of decentralized decision making by collections of barons responded to changes in relative royal power and social relations during the Norman period. This paper estimates a discrete choice model for the use of decentralized decision making using all major legal cases to measure how relative royal power affected the adjudication method. Norman England is an ideal case study because disputes were tried openly before the assembled king and barons, introducing power dynamics and social relations into the deliberations over the case outcome. There are two main results. First, enhanced royal power diminished the use of decentralized decision making because of an increased capacity to administer justice without baronial involvement, consistent with the Administrative Capacity Theory of Greif (2007). Second, use of decentralized decision making diminished as baronial coordination became more difficult and increased when the threat of royal predation rose.
520 $a The second study analyzes the rise and consequences of collective adjudication use in English courts under Henry II and Richard I. This paper empirically tests two theories for the expanded use of juries using English legal cases merged with county level data on political, economic and bureaucratic conditions. There are two robust results from a discrete choice econometric model. First, the data strongly support the Court Competition Theory which argues that collective adjudication expanded in secular courts to compete with the ecclesiastical court. Second, the data strongly reject the Adjudicator Subversion Theory of Glaeser and Shleifer which argues that collective adjudication expanded to protect adjudicators from royal coercion as the basis for expanded use of collective adjudication.
520 $a This dissertation comprises two distinct but related empirical analyzes of decision making in the adjudication of legal cases in England (1066-1199). The first study analyzes the relationship between decentralized baronial decision making and royal power to assess the nature of decision making and early constitutionalism. The second study analyzes the rise of collective adjudication, primarily as juries, during the formative period of the Common Law (1154-1199). These studies inform the institutional economics literature, beyond their contribution to Anglo-Norman history.
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2008
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