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Understanding incentives in health care.

Levine, Anna A.

Understanding incentives in health care.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Understanding incentives in health care.
Author:	Levine, Anna A.
Description:	100 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Jonathan Levin.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-10, Section: A, page: .
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-10A.
Subject:	Economics, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3332865
ISBN:	9780549847694

Understanding incentives in health care.
Levine, Anna A.

Understanding incentives in health care. - 100 p.

Adviser: Jonathan Levin.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the biotechnology pharmaceutical industry, providing both context and motivation for the empirical model estimated in Chapter 2. Chapter 1 includes a discussion of pharmaceutical drug pricing, a historical overview of the industry, as well as a quantitative description of the direct payments physicians in Minnesota received from pharmaceutical firm between 2002--2004.

ISBN: 9780549847694Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Understanding incentives in health care.
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100 $a Levine, Anna A. $3 321890
245 1 0 $a Understanding incentives in health care.
300 $a 100 p.
500 $a Adviser: Jonathan Levin.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-10, Section: A, page: .
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2008.
520 $a Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the biotechnology pharmaceutical industry, providing both context and motivation for the empirical model estimated in Chapter 2. Chapter 1 includes a discussion of pharmaceutical drug pricing, a historical overview of the industry, as well as a quantitative description of the direct payments physicians in Minnesota received from pharmaceutical firm between 2002--2004.
520 $a In the third chapter, I examine the effect of state legislation restricting physician investment in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) facilities on the usage and availability of MRI technology. I find that this legislation decreases the number of MRI machines available by 12%. In addition, I find that the legislation has a larger effect on the number of machines available in hospital based facilities than those available in non hospital based facilities. I find the law shifts where procedures are performed from hospital based facilities to non-hospital based facilities, but I do not find conclusive evidence that the law decreases the number of procedures performed in these states. In order to identify these effects, I use data from an MRI census performed from 1992--1998 as well as information on state legislation restricting physician investments in MRI facilities. My results demonstrate that when considering the effect of a law regulating contracts between experts and service providers, the law's impact on ownership patterns should be considered in addition to the law's impact on the availability of technology and the overall level of utilization.
520 $a The second chapter, empirically quantifies how market structure influences the split of producer surplus innovators receive for successful innovation in the biotechnology pharmaceutical industry. I find that pharmaceutical marketing firms' values for adding a new drug to their product portfolio depend on the distribution of the other products marketed in the same physician specialty as the drug, the size of the patient market the drug serves, and the number of physicians in the physician specialty that prescribe the drug. I show how the level of competition in the bidding market for the marketing rights of a successful innovation varies across markets. In particular, when the distribution of marketing rights for products in a physician specialty are concentrated in a single firm, the bargaining position of the innovator is weakened and this effect becomes more severe as the size of the physician specialty increases. The difference between the firm with the highest valuation and the firm with the second highest valuation increases by an average of 2% for every additional 10,000 physicians in a specialty.
590 $a School code: 0212.
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650 $a Health Sciences, Health Care Management. $3 212791
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773 0 $g 69-10A. $t Dissertation Abstracts International
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790 1 0 $a Levin, Jonathan, $e advisor
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2008
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