產品差異混合雙占模型下之企業社會責任:企業策略觀點 = Corporat...
國立高雄大學應用經濟學系碩士班

 

  • 產品差異混合雙占模型下之企業社會責任:企業策略觀點 = Corporate Social Responsibility in Mixed Duopoly Model with Product Differentiation: A Business Strategy Perspective
  • 紀錄類型: 書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
    並列題名: Corporate Social Responsibility in Mixed Duopoly Model with Product Differentiation: A Business Strategy Perspective
    作者: 王偲驊,
    其他團體作者: 國立高雄大學
    出版地: [高雄市]
    出版者: 撰者;
    出版年: 2009[民98]
    面頁冊數: 111面圖、表 : 30公分;
    標題: 企業社會責任
    標題: Consumers Preference
    電子資源: http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/26449310627068156436
    附註: 參考書目:面
    附註: 指導教授:王鳳生
    摘要註: Miltom Friedman (1962) 提出擁有社會責任的企業在法律的規範下追求利潤極大的論點,另外,Jensen(2002)也強調企業利潤和社會責任不能同時最大化。本論文首先說明企業與利害關係人的關係,接著思考兩種不同的探討觀點。第一,我們探討執行社會責任的企業相較於執行較少社會責任的企業是否賺取較高的利潤。第二,主要目的是在混和雙占模型下導出最適之企業社會責任並探討公營企業民營化後是否可改善社會福祉。在純寡雙占與混寡雙占的模型下比較兩均衡利潤,我們得到執行較多社會責任的企業賺取較高的利潤並且改善社會福祉。此外,工會在企業競爭策略裡扮演重要的角色,我們假設企業將工會的影響納入企業目標並且區分 “聯合工會”與 “個別工會”在純寡雙占與混寡雙占倆模型下探討不同工會型態與企業社會責任的關係。在純寡雙占模型下,我們發現不管企業是否執行社會責任,受雇者將偏好聯合工會型態,然而在各別工會型態下,企業較有誘因執行社會責任。若在混寡雙站模型下,結論仍顯是受雇者較偏好聯合工會型態,企業在個別工會的情境下較有誘因執行企業社會責任。特別的是,在個別工會的型態下,公營企業民營化後不會改善社會福祉,但在聯合工會型態下民營化企業會改善社會福祉。 Milton Friedman (1962) provides a survey show that the businesses with corporate social responsibility maximize profits within the bounds of the law. Another, Jensen (2002, p.238) also emphasized profits and social responsibility performance cannot be maximized simultaneously. Thesis illustrates the relationship between the business and the stakeholders in the beginning and subsequently considers two different investigable perspectives.We investigate whether social responsible businesses earn higher or lower profits than companies who spend less on corporate social responsible performances in first section. On the other hand, the purpose of the second scenario is to derive the optimal corporate social responsible activities from mixed Cournot duopoly and investigate whether the privatization of the public firm improve the social welfare or not.We derive the optimal amount of social output from Cournot competition and benchmark (the standard Cournot competition) without corporate social responsibility and then compare those results. We have demonstrated that businesses with corporate social responsibility earn higher profits and improve the social welfare than enterprise who expends less on corporate social responsible activities.Additionally, unions have played an important role in wage setting institutions are become crucial element on businesses’ competitive strategies. Hence, we assume that businesses should take the impact of unions into account in their objectives and distinguish tow structures of unionization between “Decentralization” and “Centralization” under private duopoly and mixed Cournot duopoly. We examine the interactions between different unionization structures from corporate social responsible preferences under Cournot duopoly. Our main finding is that no matter whether businesses undertake the corporate social responsible activities, the workers are better off under Cournot duopoly with centralized union structure. However, the businesses have more incentives to exert corporate social responsible activities under Cournot duopoly with decentralized union structure. Finally, we develop the mixed duopoly model associated with product differentiation and assume that the public and private firms are unionized. We point out workers better off under mixed Cournot duopoly with centralized union structure, but on the contrary the public and private firms have more incentives to undertake corporate social responsible performances under mixed Cournot duopoly with decentralized union structure. Specifically, we illustrate privatization doesn’t improve social welfare under mixed duopoly with decentralized union structure and the centralized union structure otherwise.
館藏
  • 2 筆 • 頁數 1 •
 
310001861130 博碩士論文區(二樓) 不外借資料 學位論文 TH 008M/0019 301206 1027 2009 一般使用(Normal) 在架 0
310001861122 博碩士論文區(二樓) 不外借資料 學位論文 TH 008M/0019 301206 1027 2009 c.2 一般使用(Normal) 在架 0
  • 2 筆 • 頁數 1 •
評論
Export
取書館別
 
 
變更密碼
登入