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混合寡占市場下污染、所有權與貿易分析 = Pollution, Owne...

國立高雄大學應用經濟學系碩士班

混合寡占市場下污染、所有權與貿易分析 = Pollution, Ownership, and Trade in Mixed Oligopoly

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Pollution, Ownership, and Trade in Mixed Oligopoly
作者:	陳政聖,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	民99[2010]
面頁冊數:	59面圖，表 : 30公分;
標題:	民營化
標題:	Privatization
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/15050695510821495922
摘要註:	近年來,發展中國家利用課徵環境稅和民營化政策來保護國內環境和追求社會福利;本論文將在一個混合寡占市場下的架構分別探討民營化、環境稅與國外廠商的進入模式議題。在混合同質雙占市場,公營廠商存在著無效率的問題。而公營廠商民營化後可以改善民營化前的生產無效率,但是依然會低於民營廠商的生產效率。而每個廠商可以藉由污染的減量來降低生產過程所製造的汙染。結果顯示,當民營化後可以大量改善無效率時,將藉由產出與環境稅的增加使得消費者剩餘及污染減量措施上升。在內部管理效率的議題上,我們發現內部管理措施可能不會降低環境傷害,除非內部管理可以充分的降低邊際環境傷害。然而,有效率的內部管理將會提升消費者剩餘及社會福利。在國外的進入模式議題下,在政府沒有課徵環境稅並且國外民營廠商擁有較大的生產優勢時,國外廠商將會選擇以兼併方式進入本國市場。若政府課徵環境稅時國外廠商將會選擇以直接投資方式進入本國市場。 In recent years, developing countries to protect environment and social welfare, the government always steps in to affect market, taking policy instruments such as environmental tax and privatization. This thesis will consider the issues of public policy-degree of privatization, environmental taxation, and entry mode in a mixed oligopoly setting. Under mixed duopoly market with a homogeneous good, allowing the public firm has an efficiency gap between preprivatization and postprivatization, the postprivatization improves the public firm’s production inefficiency than the preprivatization, but it exists less production inefficiency than the private firm. Each firm can prevent pollution by undertaking abatement measures. We find that when the privatization improves production inefficiency more, an increase in output results in higher consumer surplus, and more pollution abatement is devoted by all the firms coupled with higher environmental tax. Concerning the issue of governance efficiency, we show that better governance may not decrease the environmental damage unless it could sufficiently reduce marginal environmental damage. The effect of better governance increases consumer surplus and social welfare. Finally, concerning the entry mode of foreign firm and see how it would affect the environmental damage and the domestic welfare. When the government dose not set an environmental tax to control pollution and firms do not abate emissions, foreign firm will choose to acquire a domestic private firm with foreign firm has sufficiently higher production advantage. If the government sets an environmental tax to protect the environment, foreign firm never chooses to acquire.

混合寡占市場下污染、所有權與貿易分析 = Pollution, Ownership, and Trade in Mixed Oligopoly
陳, 政聖

混合寡占市場下污染、所有權與貿易分析 = Pollution, Ownership, and Trade in Mixed Oligopoly / 陳政聖撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 民99[2010]. - 59面 ; 圖，表 ; 30公分.
參考書目：面.
民營化Privatization

混合寡占市場下污染、所有權與貿易分析 = Pollution, Ownership, and Trade in Mixed Oligopoly
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