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在選舉模型下的賄選與其福利效果 = Vote Buying and It...

國立高雄大學應用經濟學系碩士班

在選舉模型下的賄選與其福利效果 = Vote Buying and Its Welfare Implication in an Election Model

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Vote Buying and Its Welfare Implication in an Election Model
作者:	王彩如,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	民100[2011]
版本:	初版
面頁冊數:	47面圖，表 : 30公分;
標題:	賄選行為
標題:	Vote Buying Behavior
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/82887536787414574248
摘要註:	本文旨在探討選舉相關因素對賄選行為及社會福利的影響。在政府努力打擊賄選之際，所首要考慮的便是影響賄選的因素是什麼？而這些選舉的相關因素又是如何影響到賄選行為？在賄選的相關文獻中，雖有提及樁腳的角色，但並未透過理論模型架構探討樁腳的實際目標函數及其決策對賄選的影響。因此，本文考慮了樁腳在Stackelberg的先動優勢下，向候選人要求佣金比率，以及候選人在第二階段勝選機率極大化的目標下，如何分配其競選資金。本文採用單一回合的賽局做為分析方式。在候選人可以透過廣告以及樁腳進行賄選時，我們透過比較靜態分析發現，當候選人的競選總資金增加，賄選所有中間選民所需的資金減少，廣告的無效率程度下降，以及樁腳的成本降低，都會使得賄選的程度更加嚴重。而在中間選民偏右，以及假設中間選民存有完全互惠性的心理下，此時，賄選行為並不受中間選民及中位數選民政策偏好的影響。 The objective of this paper is to discuss the factors in election that influence vote buying and their welfare implications.We investigate factors that cause vote buying to occur,and how these factors affect vote buying behaviors?In related literature the role played by vote-buying broker has not been formulated in any model.Therefore in this paper the objective of the broker is modeled and she/he has the (Stackelberg) first mover advantage in requesting commission,then in second stage,the candidate decides how to allocate its campaign money to maximize winning probability. In this paper a one-shot game is modeled to analyze vote buying,when the candidate could advertize as well as buy votes,we found that when candidate's campaign fund is larger,the total expense needed to buy all voters is smaller,the advertisement is more efficient,and the broker's cost is lower,then the vote buying is more serious.However,by assuming that more than half of voters are located to the right and that they are perfectly reciprocal,the policy preferences of voters do not influence vote buying behavior.

在選舉模型下的賄選與其福利效果 = Vote Buying and Its Welfare Implication in an Election Model
王, 彩如

在選舉模型下的賄選與其福利效果 = Vote Buying and Its Welfare Implication in an Election Model / 王彩如撰 - 初版. - [高雄市] : 撰者, 民100[2011]. - 47面 ; 圖，表 ; 30公分.
參考書目：面.
賄選行為Vote Buying Behavior

在選舉模型下的賄選與其福利效果 = Vote Buying and Its Welfare Implication in an Election Model
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