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Incomplete Contract Enforcement in I...

Harvard University.

Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade.
Author:	Olsen, Morten Graugaard.
Description:	239 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .
Notes:	Advisers: Pol Antras; Elhanan Helpman; Oliver Hart; Andrei Shleifer.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International72-09A.
Subject:	Economics, General.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3462776
ISBN:	9781124737683

Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade.
Olsen, Morten Graugaard.

Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade. - 239 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2011.

This dissertation consists of three chapters on incomplete contract enforcement and international Trade .

ISBN: 9781124737683Subjects--Topical Terms:

212429
Economics, General.

Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade.
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100 1 $a Olsen, Morten Graugaard. $3 531113
245 1 0 $a Incomplete Contract Enforcement in International Trade.
300 $a 239 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-09, Section: A, page: .
500 $a Advisers: Pol Antras; Elhanan Helpman; Oliver Hart; Andrei Shleifer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2011.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three chapters on incomplete contract enforcement and international Trade .
520 $a The first chapter analyzes the role of banks in overcoming incomplete international contract enforcement. It argues that banks function as mechanisms for building reputation when firms themselves are incapable of doing so and that other large entities can serve a similar purpose.
520 $a The second chapter explores the role of repeated interaction in overcoming contract enforcement domestically and argues that although repeated interaction can overcome the short run incentive for dishonest behavior when contract enforcement is poor, it comes at the cost of creating rigid relationships which can stifle innovation and lead to dynamic costs.
520 $a The third chapter explores the role of accumulated sector-specific human capital in accounting for the observed sluggish adjustment to trade liberalization, but show that the existence of sector-specific human capital might be of a benefit to low-skilled workers, even - as we suggest is the case - the existence of sector-specific human capital is predominantly a feature of less educated workers.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 212429
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 212413
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690 $a 0770
710 2 $a Harvard University. $3 212445
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 72-09A.
790 1 0 $a Antras, Pol, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Helpman, Elhanan, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Hart, Oliver, $e advisor
790 1 0 $a Shleifer, Andrei, $e advisor
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2011
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3462776