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Perfect Deterrence.

Biersteker, Thomas.

Perfect Deterrence.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Perfect Deterrence.
Author:	Zagare, Frank C.
other author:	Biersteker, Thomas.
Published:	Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2000.
Description:	443 p.
Subject:	Deterrence (Strategy).
Online resource:	Click here to view book
ISBN:	9780511491788 (electronic bk.)

Perfect Deterrence.
Zagare, Frank C.

Perfect Deterrence.[electronic resource]. - Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2000. - 443 p.

Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; 1 Classical deterrence theory; 2 Rationality and deterrence; 3 Credibility and deterrence; 4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5 Unilateral deterrence; 6 Modeling extended deterrence; 7 Modeling Massive Retaliation; 8 Modeling Flexible Response; 9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence; 10 Perfect Deterrence Theory; Appendices; Appendix 1 Deterrence models; Appendix 2 Useful definitions; Appendix 3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game

This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions.

Electronic reproduction.

Available via World Wide Web.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

ISBN: 9780511491788 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Topical Terms:

323425
Deterrence (Strategy).
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

214472
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: U162.6 .Z34 2000eb

Dewey Class. No.: 355.0217

Perfect Deterrence.
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100 1 $a Zagare, Frank C. $3 324223
245 1 0 $a Perfect Deterrence. $h [electronic resource].
260 $a Cambridge : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2000.
300 $a 443 p.
505 0 $a Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; 1 Classical deterrence theory; 2 Rationality and deterrence; 3 Credibility and deterrence; 4 Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5 Unilateral deterrence; 6 Modeling extended deterrence; 7 Modeling Massive Retaliation; 8 Modeling Flexible Response; 9 Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence; 10 Perfect Deterrence Theory; Appendices; Appendix 1 Deterrence models; Appendix 2 Useful definitions; Appendix 3 Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game
505 8 $a Appendix 4 Generalized Mutual Deterrence GameAppendix 5 Unilateral Deterrence Game; Appendix 8 Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version; References; Index
520 $a This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $n Available via World Wide Web.
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web.
650 4 $a Deterrence (Strategy). $3 323425
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local. $3 214472
700 1 $a Biersteker, Thomas. $3 322153
700 1 $a Brown, Chris. $3 322154
700 1 $a Cerny, Phil. $3 322155
700 1 $a Grieco, Joseph. $3 322156
700 1 $a Groom, A. J. R. $3 322157
700 1 $a Kilgour, D. Marc. $3 324222
700 1 $a Smith, Steve. $3 209991
710 2 $a Ebooks Corporation. $3 322111
776 1 $z 9780521781749
856 4 0 $z Click here to view book $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491788