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技術授權與最適出口政策 = Technology Licensing and Optimal Export Policy

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : monographic
Paralel Title:	Technology Licensing and Optimal Export Policy
Author:	邱唯傑,
Secondary Intellectual Responsibility:	國立高雄大學
Place of Publication:	[高雄市]
Published:	撰者;
Year of Publication:	2012[民101]
Description:	90面圖，表格 : 30公分;
Subject:	出口政策
Subject:	Export Policy
Online resource:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/29139311856529478064
Notes:	106年10月31日公開
Notes:	參考書目：面72-73
Notes:	附錄：1.圖2各項局部極大值之邊界範圍；2.圖4各項局部極大值之邊界範圍
Summary:	本文建立一個與Brander and Spencer (1985) 相同的三國兩廠商進出口模型，在模型中，有兩個分別屬不同國家、且成本不對稱之廠商，其中一家廠商擁有創新製程技術(技術專利廠商)，並擬將其專利技術授權給另一家出口競爭廠商(被授權廠商)，兩家廠商生產同質產品並同時全數出口到第三國從事Cournot競爭，兩出口國政府則分別對其出口產品實施出口政策。本文發現，廠商間成本差異與技術創新程度之大小對於授權契約與各國福利有關鍵性的影響。以下為本文結果：在技術專利廠商之母國實施出口政策之下，相較於自由貿易：(1) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商時，若兩者成本差距居中，技術專利廠商之母國的出口課稅政策可能導致授權契約由混合權利金授權改為固定權利金授權，並且使被授權廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆比自由貿易下為高；(2) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商時，若兩者成本差距居中，技術專利廠商之母國的出口補貼政策，可能導致授權契約由混合權利金授權改為單位權利金授權，並且使被授權廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆低於自由貿易下之福利。，此一結果不同於Brander and Spencer (1985)主要結果之ㄧ，出口補貼必然提升進口國之福利，大不相同。在被授權廠商之母國實施出口政策之下，相較於自由貿易：(1) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商且技術創新程度較大時，被授權廠商之母國的最適政策為對出口品課稅，且可能使技術專利廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆比自由貿易下為低；(2) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商時，若成本差異較大且技術創新程度較小，被授權廠商之母國的最適政策為對出口品補貼，且可能使技術專利廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆比自由貿易下為高。 This paper develops a Brander and Spencer (1985) model in which one home firm and one foreign firm produce homogeneous products and play Cournot competition. Assume that these firms belong to the different countries and home firm (licensor) has received a patent of cost-reducing innovation and that can license its patent to foreign firm (licensee).The government of two countries also have export policy respectively. We find that difference in cost between licensor and licensee, size of process innovation has a great impact on licensing contract and welfare of countries. There are some results as follows: If the government of licensor has export policy:(1) When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensor government is export tax which may induce contract from mix to lump-sum and a higher welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade. (2) When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensor government is export subsidy which may induce contract from mix to royalty and a lower welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade. This finding is quite different from the result of Brander and Spencer (1985). If the government of licensee has export policy: (1)When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensee government is export tax which may induce a lower welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade. (2) When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensee government is export subsidy which may induce a lower welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade.

技術授權與最適出口政策 = Technology Licensing and Optimal Export Policy
邱, 唯傑

技術授權與最適出口政策 = Technology Licensing and Optimal Export Policy / 邱唯傑撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2012[民101]. - 90面 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
106年10月31日公開參考書目：面72-73附錄：1.圖2各項局部極大值之邊界範圍；2.圖4各項局部極大值之邊界範圍.
出口政策Export Policy

技術授權與最適出口政策 = Technology Licensing and Optimal Export Policy
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330 $a 本文建立一個與Brander and Spencer (1985) 相同的三國兩廠商進出口模型，在模型中，有兩個分別屬不同國家、且成本不對稱之廠商，其中一家廠商擁有創新製程技術(技術專利廠商)，並擬將其專利技術授權給另一家出口競爭廠商(被授權廠商)，兩家廠商生產同質產品並同時全數出口到第三國從事Cournot競爭，兩出口國政府則分別對其出口產品實施出口政策。本文發現，廠商間成本差異與技術創新程度之大小對於授權契約與各國福利有關鍵性的影響。以下為本文結果：在技術專利廠商之母國實施出口政策之下，相較於自由貿易：(1) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商時，若兩者成本差距居中，技術專利廠商之母國的出口課稅政策可能導致授權契約由混合權利金授權改為固定權利金授權，並且使被授權廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆比自由貿易下為高；(2) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商時，若兩者成本差距居中，技術專利廠商之母國的出口補貼政策，可能導致授權契約由混合權利金授權改為單位權利金授權，並且使被授權廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆低於自由貿易下之福利。，此一結果不同於Brander and Spencer (1985)主要結果之ㄧ，出口補貼必然提升進口國之福利，大不相同。在被授權廠商之母國實施出口政策之下，相較於自由貿易：(1) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商且技術創新程度較大時，被授權廠商之母國的最適政策為對出口品課稅，且可能使技術專利廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆比自由貿易下為低；(2) 當技術專利廠商之邊際成本大於被授權廠商時，若成本差異較大且技術創新程度較小，被授權廠商之母國的最適政策為對出口品補貼，且可能使技術專利廠商利潤及進口國之福利皆比自由貿易下為高。 This paper develops a Brander and Spencer (1985) model in which one home firm and one foreign firm produce homogeneous products and play Cournot competition. Assume that these firms belong to the different countries and home firm (licensor) has received a patent of cost-reducing innovation and that can license its patent to foreign firm (licensee).The government of two countries also have export policy respectively. We find that difference in cost between licensor and licensee, size of process innovation has a great impact on licensing contract and welfare of countries. There are some results as follows: If the government of licensor has export policy:(1) When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensor government is export tax which may induce contract from mix to lump-sum and a higher welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade. (2) When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensor government is export subsidy which may induce contract from mix to royalty and a lower welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade. This finding is quite different from the result of Brander and Spencer (1985). If the government of licensee has export policy: (1)When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensee government is export tax which may induce a lower welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade. (2) When the marginal cost of licensor is greater than licensee, the optimal policy for licensee government is export subsidy which may induce a lower welfare of the exporting and importing countries than that under free trade.
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