國立高雄大學圖資館 |

混合寡占、技術授權與民營化 = Mixed Oligopoly, Technology Licensing, and Privatization

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Mixed Oligopoly, Technology Licensing, and Privatization
作者:	陳怡妏,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2012[民101]
面頁冊數:	56面圖，表格 : 30公分;
標題:	混合寡占
標題:	Mixed oligopoly
電子資源:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/22898814717811504316
附註:	106年10月31日公開
附註:	參考書目：面47-49
其他題名:	混合寡占技術授權與民營化
摘要註:	本文建立一個混合寡占模型以探討廠商間的技術授權行為及其對公營企業民營化政策的影響。在模型中，假設有一家公營廠商及兩家民營廠商生產同質產品並從事Cournot數量競爭，其中一家民營廠商擬將其擁有的製程專利技術授權給其它廠商。本文發現，在混合寡占下當該技術專利廠商欲將其技術授權給公營廠商時，在某些參數條件下，公營廠商不會接受民營廠商的技術授權，反之，當公營廠商接受民營廠商的技術授權時，單位權利金授權、固定權利金授權及混合權利金授權三種授權模式皆為可行；當該技術專利廠商欲將其技術授權給另一家民營廠商時，其最適授權模式為收取固定權利金，而非過去文獻所得單位權利金授權；然而，技術專利廠商同時授權給公營廠商及另一家民營廠商之情形將不會發生；最後，若公營廠商可以接受民營廠商的技術授權，政府可能因民營廠商的授權行為而改變其民營化政策。上述結果與過去相關文獻所得之結果大不相同。 This paper establishes a mixed oligopoly model with one welfare-maximizing public firm and two profit-maximizing private firms to explore the licensing behavior among the firms and the impact on the privatization policy. In the model, we assume that one of private firms owns a superior technology which is from an successful process innovation and is going to license its technology to other firm(s) (such as only public firm, only private firm or both of them) in order to get more profits. The major findings of this paper are as follows: Firstly, if the patentee licenses to the state-owned public firm, under some plausible parameters, the public firm will not accept the technology licensing from the private firm. Secondly, if the public firm accepts the licensing, all of the three different types of licensing contracts (which may consist of only royalty, only fixed-fee or the combinations of royalty and fixed-fee) can get the same social welfares. Thirdly, if the patentee licenses to another private firm, the fixed-fee licensing will be the optimal for the patentee rather than the royalty licensing. Fourthly, the patentee won't license to the state-owned firm and another private firm at the same time. Lastly, the privatization policy may be changed if the public firm can accept the technology licensing from the private firm. These above results are quite different from the previous literatures about the licensing behavior among the private firms.

混合寡占、技術授權與民營化 = Mixed Oligopoly, Technology Licensing, and Privatization
陳, 怡妏

混合寡占、技術授權與民營化 = Mixed Oligopoly, Technology Licensing, and Privatization / 陳怡妏撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2012[民101]. - 56面 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
106年10月31日公開參考書目：面47-49.
混合寡占Mixed oligopoly

混合寡占、技術授權與民營化 = Mixed Oligopoly, Technology Licensing, and Privatization
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