國立高雄大學圖資館 |

Language: English

Back

廠商研發與技術授權 = R&D and Technology Licensing

國立高雄大學經營管理研究所

廠商研發與技術授權 = R&D and Technology Licensing

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : monographic
Paralel Title:	R&D and Technology Licensing
Author:	蘇治維,
Secondary Intellectual Responsibility:	國立高雄大學
Place of Publication:	高雄市
Published:	國立高雄大學;
Year of Publication:	民102[2013]
Description:	31葉圖，表格 : 30公分;
Subject:	成本差異
Subject:	Cost differentiation
Online resource:	https://hdl.handle.net/11296/6cd8wr
Notes:	107年11月1日公開
Notes:	參考書目：葉30-31
Summary:	本論文建立一個雙佔模型，分別在兩大小廠商之研發成果不授權以及可以授權下，討論兩廠商的最適研發水準及相關的福利效果。本論文發現，當廠商的研發成果不能授權時，大廠商的研發水準以及社會福利皆高於小廠商。當廠商的研發成果可以授權時，我們可發現在某些參數條件下，小廠商研發後的社會福利將會高於大廠商。若兩廠商原始邊際成本的差異較小，則政府應優先對大廠商進行研發補貼；若成本差異居中時，且研發的效率較佳(差)，則政府應對小(大)廠商進行研發補貼；若研發的效率較差，政府仍對大廠商進行研發補貼；若成本差異較大，則政府應對大廠商進行研發補貼。 I develop a duopoly model where two firms with asymmetry cost (one with high ex-ante marginal cost, the other with low ex-ante marginal cost) engage in process innovation and play Cournot competition in final good market. I will compare the innovation level and associate welfare between the two firms when the innovated technology can/cannot be licensed. I show that even though both the innovation level of the firm with low ex-ante marginal cost (i.e., the large firm) is always higher than that of the firm with high ex-ante marginal cost (i.e., the small firm) when the innovated technology can/cannot be licensed, whereas, when the cost different between the two firms is moderate and innovation function is more efficient, the social welfare when the large cost firm innovates may be greater than that when the low cost firm innovates.

廠商研發與技術授權 = R&D and Technology Licensing
蘇, 治維

廠商研發與技術授權 = R&D and Technology Licensing / 蘇治維撰 - 高雄市 : 國立高雄大學, 民102[2013]. - 31葉 ; 圖，表格 ; 30公分.
107年11月1日公開參考書目：葉30-31.
成本差異Cost differentiation

廠商研發與技術授權 = R&D and Technology Licensing
LDR:02619nam a2200277 450 001 389682
005 20190102102619.0
010 0 $b 精裝
010 0 $b 平裝
100 $a 20130926y2013 k y0chiy50 e
101 1 $a chi $d chi $d eng
102 $a tw
105 $a ak am 000yy
200 1 $a 廠商研發與技術授權 $d R&D and Technology Licensing $z eng $f 蘇治維撰
210 $a 高雄市 $c 國立高雄大學 $d 民102[2013]
215 0 $a 31葉 $c 圖，表格 $d 30公分
300 $a 107年11月1日公開
300 $a 參考書目：葉30-31
314 $a 指導教授：楊雅博博士
328 $a 碩士論文--國立高雄大學經營管理研究所碩士班
330 $a 本論文建立一個雙佔模型，分別在兩大小廠商之研發成果不授權以及可以授權下，討論兩廠商的最適研發水準及相關的福利效果。本論文發現，當廠商的研發成果不能授權時，大廠商的研發水準以及社會福利皆高於小廠商。當廠商的研發成果可以授權時，我們可發現在某些參數條件下，小廠商研發後的社會福利將會高於大廠商。若兩廠商原始邊際成本的差異較小，則政府應優先對大廠商進行研發補貼；若成本差異居中時，且研發的效率較佳(差)，則政府應對小(大)廠商進行研發補貼；若研發的效率較差，政府仍對大廠商進行研發補貼；若成本差異較大，則政府應對大廠商進行研發補貼。 I develop a duopoly model where two firms with asymmetry cost (one with high ex-ante marginal cost, the other with low ex-ante marginal cost) engage in process innovation and play Cournot competition in final good market. I will compare the innovation level and associate welfare between the two firms when the innovated technology can/cannot be licensed. I show that even though both the innovation level of the firm with low ex-ante marginal cost (i.e., the large firm) is always higher than that of the firm with high ex-ante marginal cost (i.e., the small firm) when the innovated technology can/cannot be licensed, whereas, when the cost different between the two firms is moderate and innovation function is more efficient, the social welfare when the large cost firm innovates may be greater than that when the low cost firm innovates.
510 1 $a R&D and Technology Licensing $z eng
610 # 0 $a 成本差異 $a 技術授權 $a 製程創新
610 # 1 $a Cost differentiation $a Technology licensing $a Process innovation
681 $a 008M/0019 $b 301208 4432 $v 2007年版
700 1 $a 蘇 $b 治維 $4 撰 $3 614542
712 0 2 $a 國立高雄大學 $b 經營管理研究所 $3 170850
801 0 $a tw $b 國立高雄大學 $c 20181114 $g CCR
856 7 # $u https://hdl.handle.net/11296/6cd8wr $z 電子資源 $2 http