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廠商不對稱下的技術授權策略 = Technology licensing...

國立高雄大學經營管理研究所

廠商不對稱下的技術授權策略 = Technology licensing strategy when firms are asymmetric

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : 單行本
並列題名:	Technology licensing strategy when firms are asymmetric
作者:	王晧安,
其他團體作者:	國立高雄大學
出版地:	[高雄市]
出版者:	撰者;
出版年:	2014[民103]
面頁冊數:	57葉圖，表 : 30公分;
標題:	技術授權
標題:	Technology licensing
電子資源:	https://hdl.handle.net/11296/shnk96
附註:	108年10月31日公開
附註:	參考書目：葉50-51
摘要註:	本文建立一個寡占模型以探討一產業外技術專利廠商對兩家成本不對稱廠商間的技術授權行為。在模型中，假設有一家產業外之技術專利廠商，擬對兩家生產同質產品且從事Cournot數量競爭，進行專利製程技術之授權。本文主要結果如下：當技術專利廠商先與原始邊際成本較低的大廠，再與原始邊際成本較高的小廠簽訂授權契約時，在兩廠商間的成本差異較小之下，若技術研發水準較小(較大)，則其最適授權契約為先與大廠簽訂固定(固定、混合)權利金契約，再與小廠簽訂固定權利金契約；在兩廠商間的成本差異較大之下，技術專利廠商皆會與兩廠商簽訂固定權利金契約。當技術專利廠商先與原始邊際成本較高的小廠，再與原始邊際成本較低的大廠簽訂授權契約時，其最適授權契約為先與小廠簽訂固定(固定、混合)權利金契約，再與大廠簽訂固定權利金契約。此外，我們也發現，產業外之技術專利廠商先與小廠商簽訂授權契約再與大廠商簽授權契約可獲得較高的授權金收入。以上結果是探討產業外授權之文獻未曾討論過的有趣結果。 This paper establishes an oligopoly model with one technology licensing firm in the outside industry and two firms with asymmetry cost to explore the licensing behavior among the firms. In the model, we assume that one technology licensing firm in the outside industry is going to license its technology to two firms and play Cournot competition in the same products. The major findings of this paper are as follows: when the technology licensing firm license to the firm with low marginal cost (i.e., the large firm), and then license to the firm with high marginal cost (i.e., the small firm), under the cost differentiation between the two firms is smaller, if the innovation level is smaller ( larger ) , then the optimal license contract is a fixed fee (fixed and mixed) contract with the large firm, and then license to the small firm with a fixed-fee contract; under the cost differentiation between the two firms is larger, the technology licensing firm license to two firms with fixed-fee contracts. When the technology licensing firm license to the small firm, and then license to the large firm, then the optimal license contract is a fixed fee (fixed and mixed) contract with the small firm, and fixed-fee contract with the large firm. In addition, we also find that the technology firm can obtain higher licensing fee by first licensing to the small firm and then licensing to the large firm. These interesting results has not discussed by the previous literatures.

廠商不對稱下的技術授權策略 = Technology licensing strategy when firms are asymmetric
王, 晧安

廠商不對稱下的技術授權策略 = Technology licensing strategy when firms are asymmetric / 王晧安撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2014[民103]. - 57葉 ; 圖，表 ; 30公分.
108年10月31日公開參考書目：葉50-51.
技術授權Technology licensing

廠商不對稱下的技術授權策略 = Technology licensing strategy when firms are asymmetric
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330 $a 本文建立一個寡占模型以探討一產業外技術專利廠商對兩家成本不對稱廠商間的技術授權行為。在模型中，假設有一家產業外之技術專利廠商，擬對兩家生產同質產品且從事Cournot數量競爭，進行專利製程技術之授權。本文主要結果如下：當技術專利廠商先與原始邊際成本較低的大廠，再與原始邊際成本較高的小廠簽訂授權契約時，在兩廠商間的成本差異較小之下，若技術研發水準較小(較大)，則其最適授權契約為先與大廠簽訂固定(固定、混合)權利金契約，再與小廠簽訂固定權利金契約；在兩廠商間的成本差異較大之下，技術專利廠商皆會與兩廠商簽訂固定權利金契約。當技術專利廠商先與原始邊際成本較高的小廠，再與原始邊際成本較低的大廠簽訂授權契約時，其最適授權契約為先與小廠簽訂固定(固定、混合)權利金契約，再與大廠簽訂固定權利金契約。此外，我們也發現，產業外之技術專利廠商先與小廠商簽訂授權契約再與大廠商簽授權契約可獲得較高的授權金收入。以上結果是探討產業外授權之文獻未曾討論過的有趣結果。 This paper establishes an oligopoly model with one technology licensing firm in the outside industry and two firms with asymmetry cost to explore the licensing behavior among the firms. In the model, we assume that one technology licensing firm in the outside industry is going to license its technology to two firms and play Cournot competition in the same products. The major findings of this paper are as follows: when the technology licensing firm license to the firm with low marginal cost (i.e., the large firm), and then license to the firm with high marginal cost (i.e., the small firm), under the cost differentiation between the two firms is smaller, if the innovation level is smaller ( larger ) , then the optimal license contract is a fixed fee (fixed and mixed) contract with the large firm, and then license to the small firm with a fixed-fee contract; under the cost differentiation between the two firms is larger, the technology licensing firm license to two firms with fixed-fee contracts. When the technology licensing firm license to the small firm, and then license to the large firm, then the optimal license contract is a fixed fee (fixed and mixed) contract with the small firm, and fixed-fee contract with the large firm. In addition, we also find that the technology firm can obtain higher licensing fee by first licensing to the small firm and then licensing to the large firm. These interesting results has not discussed by the previous literatures.
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