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The puzzle of perceptual justificati...

Ghijsen, Harmen.

The puzzle of perceptual justificationconscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The puzzle of perceptual justificationby Harmen Ghijsen.
其他題名:	conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /
作者:	Ghijsen, Harmen.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2016.
面頁冊數:	xiii, 165 p. :digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Philosophy.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30500-4
ISBN:	9783319305004$q(electronic bk.)

The puzzle of perceptual justificationconscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /
Ghijsen, Harmen.

The puzzle of perceptual justificationconscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /[electronic resource] :by Harmen Ghijsen. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2016. - xiii, 165 p. :digital ;24 cm. - Synthese library ;v.377. - Synthese library ;v.344..

Chapter 1. Perception, Hallucination and Justification -- Chapter 2. Evidentialism and the Problem of Fit -- Chapter 3. Dogmatism and the Distinctiveness Problem -- Chapter 4. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Higher-Order Issues -- Chapter 5. Process Reliabilism and Its Classic Problems -- Chapter 6. A Higher-Order Rejoinder for Reliabilism.

This book provides an accessible and up-to-date discussion of contemporary theories of perceptual justification that each highlight different factors related to perception, i.e., conscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes. The book's discussion starts from the viewpoint that perception is not only one of our fundamental sources of knowledge and justification, but also plays this role for many less sophisticated animals. It proposes a scientifically informed reliabilist theory which can accommodate this fact without denying that some of our epistemic abilities as human perceivers are special. This allows it to combine many of our intuitions about the importance of conscious experience and higher-order belief with the controversial thesis that perceptual justification is fundamentally non-evidential in character.

ISBN: 9783319305004$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-30500-4doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

176573
Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: BD161 / .G455 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 121.34

The puzzle of perceptual justificationconscious experience, higher-order beliefs, and reliable processes /
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