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The theory of extensive form games

Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.

The theory of extensive form games

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The theory of extensive form gamesby Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger.
Author:	Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
other author:	Ritzberger, Klaus.
Published:	Berlin, Heidelberg :Springer Berlin Heidelberg :2016.
Description:	xv, 239 p. :ill., digital ;25 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Economics, Mathematical.
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3
ISBN:	9783662499443$q(electronic bk.)

The theory of extensive form games
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.

The theory of extensive form games[electronic resource] /by Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger. - Berlin, Heidelberg :Springer Berlin Heidelberg :2016. - xv, 239 p. :ill., digital ;25 cm. - Springer series in game theory, official series of the game theory society,1868-517X. - Springer series in game theory, official series of the game theory society..

Introduction -- Game Trees -- Pseudotrees and Order Theory -- Extensive Decision Problems -- Extensive Forms -- Discrete Extensive Forms -- Equilibrium -- A Mathematical Appendix.

This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.

ISBN: 9783662499443$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

182903
Economics, Mathematical.

LC Class. No.: HB144 / .A46 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 330.015193

The theory of extensive form games
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245 1 4 $a The theory of extensive form games $h [electronic resource] / $c by Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger.
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505 0 $a Introduction -- Game Trees -- Pseudotrees and Order Theory -- Extensive Decision Problems -- Extensive Forms -- Discrete Extensive Forms -- Equilibrium -- A Mathematical Appendix.
520 $a This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.
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