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Elections, voting rules and paradoxi...

Gehrlein, William V.

Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomesby William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley.
Author:	Gehrlein, William V.
other author:	Lepelley, Dominique.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017.
Description:	xiv, 183 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	ElectionsRules.
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6
ISBN:	9783319646596$q(electronic bk.)

Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
Gehrlein, William V.

Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes[electronic resource] /by William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017. - xiv, 183 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Studies in choice and welfare,1614-0311. - Studies in choice and welfare..

Elections and Voting Paradoxes -- Probabilities of Voting Paradoxes -- Measures of Agreement in Voters' Preferences -- Single-Stage Election Procedure -- Two-Stage Election Procedures -- The Impact of Voter Indifference -- Other Voting Rules and Considerations.

This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.

ISBN: 9783319646596$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

794588
Elections
--Rules.

LC Class. No.: JF1001 / .G44 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 324.6

Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
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245 1 0 $a Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes $h [electronic resource] / $c by William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley.
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490 1 $a Studies in choice and welfare, $x 1614-0311
505 0 $a Elections and Voting Paradoxes -- Probabilities of Voting Paradoxes -- Measures of Agreement in Voters' Preferences -- Single-Stage Election Procedure -- Two-Stage Election Procedures -- The Impact of Voter Indifference -- Other Voting Rules and Considerations.
520 $a This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.
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650 2 4 $a Electoral Politics. $3 739989
650 2 4 $a Game Theory. $3 737094
650 2 4 $a Operations Research/Decision Theory. $3 273963
700 1 $a Lepelley, Dominique. $3 509669
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