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The Huawei and Snowden questionsCan ...

Lysne, Olav.

The Huawei and Snowden questionsCan electronic equipment from untrusted vendors be verified? Can an untrusted vendor build trust into electronic equipment? /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Huawei and Snowden questionsby Olav Lysne.
其他題名:	Can electronic equipment from untrusted vendors be verified? Can an untrusted vendor build trust into electronic equipment? /
作者:	Lysne, Olav.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2018.
面頁冊數:	xiv, 116 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Computer security.
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74950-1
ISBN:	9783319749501$q(electronic bk.)

The Huawei and Snowden questionsCan electronic equipment from untrusted vendors be verified? Can an untrusted vendor build trust into electronic equipment? /
Lysne, Olav.

The Huawei and Snowden questionsCan electronic equipment from untrusted vendors be verified? Can an untrusted vendor build trust into electronic equipment? /[electronic resource] :by Olav Lysne. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2018. - xiv, 116 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Simula SpringerBriefs on computing ;v.4. - Simula SpringerBriefs on computing ;v.1..

Open access.

Preliminary This book is open access under a CC BY 4.0 license. This book answers two central questions: firstly, is it at all possible to verify electronic equipment procured from untrusted vendors? Secondly, can I build trust into my products in such a way that I support verification by untrusting customers? In separate chapters the book takes readers through the state of the art in fields of computer science that can shed light on these questions. In a concluding chapter it discusses realistic ways forward. In discussions on cyber security, there is a tacit assumption that the manufacturer of equipment will collaborate with the user of the equipment to stop third-party wrongdoers. The Snowden files and recent deliberations on the use of Chinese equipment in the critical infrastructures of western countries have changed this. The discourse in both cases revolves around what malevolent manufacturers can do to harm their own customers, and the importance of the matter is on par with questions of national security. This book is of great interest to ICT and security professionals who need a clear understanding of the two questions posed in the subtitle, and to decision-makers in industry, national bodies and nation states.

ISBN: 9783319749501$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-74950-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

184416
Computer security.

LC Class. No.: QA76.9.A25

Dewey Class. No.: 005.8

The Huawei and Snowden questionsCan electronic equipment from untrusted vendors be verified? Can an untrusted vendor build trust into electronic equipment? /
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