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Game theory for managing security in...

Reniers, Genserik.

Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areasby Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers.
Author:	Zhang, Laobing.
other author:	Reniers, Genserik.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2018.
Description:	xiv, 157 p. :digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Chemical industrySecurity measures.
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92618-6
ISBN:	9783319926186$q(electronic bk.)

Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas
Zhang, Laobing.

Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas[electronic resource] /by Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2018. - xiv, 157 p. :digital ;24 cm. - Advanced sciences and technologies for security applications,1613-5113. - Advanced sciences and technologies for security applications..

Introduction -- 1. Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: the State of the Art -- 2. Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory -- 3. Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection -- 4. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-free Uncertainties -- 5. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality -- 6. Multi-Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Clusters Patrolling -- 7. Case Studies. 8. Conclusions and Recommendations.

This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries. The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers. In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike.

ISBN: 9783319926186$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-92618-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

820765
Chemical industry
--Security measures.

LC Class. No.: TP150.S24 / Z436 2018

Dewey Class. No.: 660

Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas
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245 1 0 $a Game theory for managing security in chemical industrial areas $h [electronic resource] / $c by Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers.
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505 0 $a Introduction -- 1. Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: the State of the Art -- 2. Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory -- 3. Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection -- 4. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-free Uncertainties -- 5. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality -- 6. Multi-Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Clusters Patrolling -- 7. Case Studies. 8. Conclusions and Recommendations.
520 $a This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries. The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers. In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike.
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