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Seemings and epistemic justification...

Moretti, Luca.

Seemings and epistemic justificationhow appearances justify beliefs /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Seemings and epistemic justificationby Luca Moretti.
其他題名:	how appearances justify beliefs /
作者:	Moretti, Luca.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2020.
面頁冊數:	viii, 91 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Knowledge, Theory of.
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5
ISBN:	9783030433925$q(electronic bk.)

Seemings and epistemic justificationhow appearances justify beliefs /
Moretti, Luca.

Seemings and epistemic justificationhow appearances justify beliefs /[electronic resource] :by Luca Moretti. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2020. - viii, 91 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - SpringerBriefs in philosophy,2211-4548. - SpringerBriefs in philosophy..

1. Introduction -- 2. Phenomenal Conservatism -- 3. Bayesian objections -- 4. Easy justification -- 5. The problem of reflective awareness -- 6. Inferential seemings and reflective awareness -- 7. Conclusions.

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices. This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its anti-septical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances.

ISBN: 9783030433925$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

178850
Knowledge, Theory of.

LC Class. No.: BD161 / .M67 2020

Dewey Class. No.: 121

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