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Emotions as original existencesa the...
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Emotions as original existencesa theory of emotion, motivation and the self /
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Emotions as original existencesby Demian Whiting.
其他題名:
a theory of emotion, motivation and the self /
作者:
Whiting, Demian.
出版者:
Cham :Springer International Publishing :2020.
面頁冊數:
xi, 233 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:
Springer Nature eBook
標題:
Self.
電子資源:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54682-3
ISBN:
9783030546823$q(electronic bk.)
Emotions as original existencesa theory of emotion, motivation and the self /
Whiting, Demian.
Emotions as original existences
a theory of emotion, motivation and the self /[electronic resource] :by Demian Whiting. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2020. - xi, 233 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Emotions as Conscious Mental States -- Chapter 3: Emotions as Original Existences -- Chapter 4: Urges of the Heart -- Chapter 5: Emotion and Moral Thought -- Chapter 6: Emotion, Virtue, and Situationism -- Chapter 7: Our Emotional Cores -- Chapter 8: Emotion and The Fractured Self.
This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as 'original existences': feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion is key to a proper understanding of human motivation and the self. Whiting establishes that emotions as types of bodily feelings serve as the categorical bases for our behavioural dispositions, including those associated with moral thought, virtue, and vice. The book concludes by advancing the idea that emotions make up our intrinsic nature - the characterisation of what we are like in and of ourselves, when considered apart from how we are disposed to behave. The conclusion additionally draws out the implications of the claims made throughout the book in relation to our understanding of mental illness and the treatment of emotional disorders.
ISBN: 9783030546823$q(electronic bk.)
Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-54682-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:
176651
Self.
LC Class. No.: BD438.5 / .W458 2020
Dewey Class. No.: 126
Emotions as original existencesa theory of emotion, motivation and the self /
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Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Emotions as Conscious Mental States -- Chapter 3: Emotions as Original Existences -- Chapter 4: Urges of the Heart -- Chapter 5: Emotion and Moral Thought -- Chapter 6: Emotion, Virtue, and Situationism -- Chapter 7: Our Emotional Cores -- Chapter 8: Emotion and The Fractured Self.
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This book defends the much-disputed view that emotions are what Hume referred to as 'original existences': feeling states that have no intentional or representational properties of their own. In doing so, the book serves as a valuable counterbalance to the now mainstream view that emotions are representational mental states. Beginning with a defence of a feeling theory of emotion, Whiting opens up a whole new way of thinking about the role and centrality of emotion in our lives, showing how emotion is key to a proper understanding of human motivation and the self. Whiting establishes that emotions as types of bodily feelings serve as the categorical bases for our behavioural dispositions, including those associated with moral thought, virtue, and vice. The book concludes by advancing the idea that emotions make up our intrinsic nature - the characterisation of what we are like in and of ourselves, when considered apart from how we are disposed to behave. The conclusion additionally draws out the implications of the claims made throughout the book in relation to our understanding of mental illness and the treatment of emotional disorders.
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