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Corporate Board and Corporate Govern...

The University of Liverpool (United Kingdom).

Corporate Board and Corporate Governance in Chinese Capital Markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Corporate Board and Corporate Governance in Chinese Capital Markets.
作者:	Wang, Chen.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019
面頁冊數:	179 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-12, Section: A.
附註:	Advisor: Ye, Qing.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-12A.
標題:	Management.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28018255
ISBN:	9798662369528

Corporate Board and Corporate Governance in Chinese Capital Markets.
Wang, Chen.

Corporate Board and Corporate Governance in Chinese Capital Markets. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 179 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Liverpool (United Kingdom), 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In the context of corporate governance, this thesis aims to further investigate the impact of corporate boards on the effectiveness of company governance. First, by investigates outside director activism behaviors which measured by their dissenting opinions, intended meeting absences and voluntary resignations, I find that the incidence of activism predicts a higher incidence of enforcement action against fraud, suggesting outside directors are playing a whistleblower role rather than a disciplinary role, and the activism signal is found to attract the attention of outside investors which strengthen the sensitivity between CEO turnover and regulatory enforcement actions. The findings support outside directors may not directly discipline manager behaviors but use their whistleblower role to attract public outrage to override CEO entrenchment. Second, this thesis studies the impact of corporate secretary tenure on governance quality. Results show that corporate secretary tenure is negatively associated with board meeting frequency, outside directors’ in-meeting dissent and the incidence of fraud and lawsuits, and the findings are robust by additional tests. The results support the notion that tenure of the corporate secretary is no longer a “humble clerk” and can significantly influence a firm’s governance quality. Third, this thesis examines whether director with additional directorships on the boards of firms that are shareholders of the original firm is good for shareholders’ wealth. To conduct the analysis, I use the percentage of board directors of a listed firm who have also taken an additional directorship on the board of its shareholders as a measure and named it as Shareholder Interlock Director Ratio (SIDR) and find the SIDR is positively correlated with the industry-adjusted ROA, and negatively correlated with both fraud and lawsuit, such results are robust by additional tests including taking alternative measures of the SIDR, as well as the impact of the SIDR on tunneling behavior, outside director attendance and shareholder voting behaviors. These findings suggest the director interlock in shareholder’s board is good for providing better governance services. Overall, this thesis further advances the exploration on factors that affect corporate governance quality. 

ISBN: 9798662369528Subjects--Topical Terms:

180005
Management.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Boards of directors

Corporate Board and Corporate Governance in Chinese Capital Markets.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-12, Section: A.
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520 $a In the context of corporate governance, this thesis aims to further investigate the impact of corporate boards on the effectiveness of company governance. First, by investigates outside director activism behaviors which measured by their dissenting opinions, intended meeting absences and voluntary resignations, I find that the incidence of activism predicts a higher incidence of enforcement action against fraud, suggesting outside directors are playing a whistleblower role rather than a disciplinary role, and the activism signal is found to attract the attention of outside investors which strengthen the sensitivity between CEO turnover and regulatory enforcement actions. The findings support outside directors may not directly discipline manager behaviors but use their whistleblower role to attract public outrage to override CEO entrenchment. Second, this thesis studies the impact of corporate secretary tenure on governance quality. Results show that corporate secretary tenure is negatively associated with board meeting frequency, outside directors’ in-meeting dissent and the incidence of fraud and lawsuits, and the findings are robust by additional tests. The results support the notion that tenure of the corporate secretary is no longer a “humble clerk” and can significantly influence a firm’s governance quality. Third, this thesis examines whether director with additional directorships on the boards of firms that are shareholders of the original firm is good for shareholders’ wealth. To conduct the analysis, I use the percentage of board directors of a listed firm who have also taken an additional directorship on the board of its shareholders as a measure and named it as Shareholder Interlock Director Ratio (SIDR) and find the SIDR is positively correlated with the industry-adjusted ROA, and negatively correlated with both fraud and lawsuit, such results are robust by additional tests including taking alternative measures of the SIDR, as well as the impact of the SIDR on tunneling behavior, outside director attendance and shareholder voting behaviors. These findings suggest the director interlock in shareholder’s board is good for providing better governance services. Overall, this thesis further advances the exploration on factors that affect corporate governance quality. 
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