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Too-big-to-fail in bankingimpact of ...

Lesche, Tom Filip.

Too-big-to-fail in bankingimpact of G-SIB designation and regulation on relative equity valuations /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Too-big-to-fail in bankingby Tom Filip Lesche.
Reminder of title:	impact of G-SIB designation and regulation on relative equity valuations /
Author:	Lesche, Tom Filip.
Published:	Wiesbaden :Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden :2021.
Description:	xix, 248 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Banking law.
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34182-4
ISBN:	9783658341824$q(electronic bk.)

Too-big-to-fail in bankingimpact of G-SIB designation and regulation on relative equity valuations /
Lesche, Tom Filip.

Too-big-to-fail in bankingimpact of G-SIB designation and regulation on relative equity valuations /[electronic resource] :by Tom Filip Lesche. - Wiesbaden :Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden :2021. - xix, 248 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Finanzwirtschaft, banken und bankmanagement / finance, banks and bank management,2524-6429. - Finanzwirtschaft, banken und bankmanagement / finance, banks and bank management..

1 Introduction and Overview -- 2 A Primer for Economics of Banking -- Part I Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking Review -- 3 Introduction to Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking -- 4 TBTF Causal Chain: Explicit and Implicit Government Guarantees -- 5 Public Cost and Benets of TBTF -- 6 TBTF Policy Recommendations -- 7 TBTF Policy Initiatives -- 8 Conclusion -- Part II Quantifying the Shareholder Value of Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking -- 9 Related Research -- 10 Hypothesis Development -- 11 Empirical Methodology and Data -- 12 Results and Discussion -- 13 Conclusion.

This book provides a comprehensive summary of the latest academic research on the important topic of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) in banking. It explains TBTF from various perspectives including the range of regulatory measures proposed to counter TBTF, most notably the globally accepted regulation of global-systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and its main tool of capital surcharges. The empirical analysis quantifies the shareholder value of the G-SIB attribution by using quarterly observations from more than 750 global banks between Q2 2008 and Q3 2015. The main finding is that G-SIBs are confronted with a substantial relative valuation discount compared to non-G-SIBs. From the end of 2011 until the end of 2015, a stable discount of 0.6x-0.8x price-to-tangible common equity (P/TCE) is statistically highly significant. The results suggest that the G-SIB designation effect, which positively impacts G-SIBs' share prices because of funding benefits from IGGs, is dominated by the regulatory G-SIB burden effect, which negatively impacts G-SIBs' share prices because of lower profitability due to capital surcharges and other regulatory requirements placed on G-SIBs. The findings re-open the debate about whether breaking up G-SIBs would unlock shareholder value and whether G-SIBs are regulated efficiently. About the Author Dr. Tom Filip Lesche is a venture capitalist investing into financial technology companies. Previously he was an investment banker advising financial institutions on capital markets and M&A transactions.

ISBN: 9783658341824$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-658-34182-4doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

192251
Banking law.

LC Class. No.: K1066

Dewey Class. No.: 346.082

Too-big-to-fail in bankingimpact of G-SIB designation and regulation on relative equity valuations /
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505 0 $a 1 Introduction and Overview -- 2 A Primer for Economics of Banking -- Part I Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking Review -- 3 Introduction to Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking -- 4 TBTF Causal Chain: Explicit and Implicit Government Guarantees -- 5 Public Cost and Benets of TBTF -- 6 TBTF Policy Recommendations -- 7 TBTF Policy Initiatives -- 8 Conclusion -- Part II Quantifying the Shareholder Value of Too-Big-to-Fail in Banking -- 9 Related Research -- 10 Hypothesis Development -- 11 Empirical Methodology and Data -- 12 Results and Discussion -- 13 Conclusion.
520 $a This book provides a comprehensive summary of the latest academic research on the important topic of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) in banking. It explains TBTF from various perspectives including the range of regulatory measures proposed to counter TBTF, most notably the globally accepted regulation of global-systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and its main tool of capital surcharges. The empirical analysis quantifies the shareholder value of the G-SIB attribution by using quarterly observations from more than 750 global banks between Q2 2008 and Q3 2015. The main finding is that G-SIBs are confronted with a substantial relative valuation discount compared to non-G-SIBs. From the end of 2011 until the end of 2015, a stable discount of 0.6x-0.8x price-to-tangible common equity (P/TCE) is statistically highly significant. The results suggest that the G-SIB designation effect, which positively impacts G-SIBs' share prices because of funding benefits from IGGs, is dominated by the regulatory G-SIB burden effect, which negatively impacts G-SIBs' share prices because of lower profitability due to capital surcharges and other regulatory requirements placed on G-SIBs. The findings re-open the debate about whether breaking up G-SIBs would unlock shareholder value and whether G-SIBs are regulated efficiently. About the Author Dr. Tom Filip Lesche is a venture capitalist investing into financial technology companies. Previously he was an investment banker advising financial institutions on capital markets and M&A transactions.
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