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The political economy of internation...

Kiesow Cortez, Florian.

The political economy of international agreementsa collection of essays /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The political economy of international agreementsedited by Florian Kiesow Cortez.
Reminder of title:	a collection of essays /
other author:	Kiesow Cortez, Florian.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2021.
Description:	vii, 122 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	International relations.
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1
ISBN:	9783030851941$q(electronic bk.)

The political economy of international agreementsa collection of essays /
The political economy of international agreementsa collection of essays /[electronic resource] :edited by Florian Kiesow Cortez. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2021. - vii, 122 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - International law and economics,2364-186X. - International law and economics..

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Domestic Institutions and the Political Economy of International Agreements: A Survey and Hypotheses -- Chapter 3. Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies -- Chapter 4. Choosing to Be Constrained: Electoral Institutions and the Varieties of International Organizations -- Chapter 5. Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective.

This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians' incentives to enter into binding international agreements.

ISBN: 9783030851941$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

174750
International relations.

LC Class. No.: JZ1242 / .P65 2021

Dewey Class. No.: 327

The political economy of international agreementsa collection of essays /
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245 0 4 $a The political economy of international agreements $h [electronic resource] : $b a collection of essays / $c edited by Florian Kiesow Cortez.
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300 $a vii, 122 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
490 1 $a International law and economics, $x 2364-186X
505 0 $a Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Domestic Institutions and the Political Economy of International Agreements: A Survey and Hypotheses -- Chapter 3. Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies -- Chapter 4. Choosing to Be Constrained: Electoral Institutions and the Varieties of International Organizations -- Chapter 5. Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective.
520 $a This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians' incentives to enter into binding international agreements.
650 0 $a International relations. $3 174750
650 0 $a International obligations. $3 201389
650 1 4 $a Law and Economics. $3 274032
650 2 4 $a Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy. $3 823768
650 2 4 $a Electoral Politics. $3 739989
650 2 4 $a International Economics. $3 273685
650 2 4 $a International Organization. $3 739831
700 1 $a Kiesow Cortez, Florian. $3 907026
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830 0 $a International law and economics. $3 712812
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1
950 $a Economics and Finance (SpringerNature-41170)