國立高雄大學圖資館 |

Language: English

Back

Logical empiricism and naturalismneurath and Carnap's metatheory of science /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Logical empiricism and naturalismby Joseph Bentley.
Reminder of title:	neurath and Carnap's metatheory of science /
Author:	Bentley, Joseph.
Published:	Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2023.
Description:	1 online resource (xviii, 216 p.) :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Naturalism.
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29328-3
ISBN:	9783031293283$q(electronic bk.)

Logical empiricism and naturalismneurath and Carnap's metatheory of science /
Bentley, Joseph.

Logical empiricism and naturalismneurath and Carnap's metatheory of science /[electronic resource] :by Joseph Bentley. - Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2023. - 1 online resource (xviii, 216 p.) :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Vienna Circle Institute library ;v. 8. - Vienna Circle Institute library ;v. 6..

Introduction -- 1. Naturalism and the Vienna Circle -- 2. Neurath's Epistemology of Science -- 3. Neurath's Conception of Protocol Statements -- 4. Carnapian Explication -- 5. Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity -- 6. Challenges to the Bipartite Metatheory Interpretation -- 7. Bipartite Metatheory in Application.

This text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative metatheory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provides a new interpretation of Carnap's conception of analyticity, allowing for a refutation of the Quinean argument for the incompatibility of naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In doing so, the relevance and potential importance of their scientific meta-theory for contemporary questions in the philosophy of science is demonstrated. This text appeals to students and researchers working on Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, as well as proponents of naturalized epistemology.

ISBN: 9783031293283$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-29328-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

190133
Naturalism.

LC Class. No.: B828.2

Dewey Class. No.: 146

Logical empiricism and naturalismneurath and Carnap's metatheory of science /
LDR:02638nmm a2200337 a 4500 001 638307
003 DE-He213
005 20230601051849.0
006 m d
007 cr nn 008maaau
008 230921s2023 sz s 0 eng d
020 $a 9783031293283$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a 9783031293276$q(paper)
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-031-29328-3 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-031-29328-3
040 $a GP $c GP
041 0 $a eng
050 4 $a B828.2
072 7 $a HPCF5 $2 bicssc
072 7 $a PHI039000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a QDHR9 $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 146 $2 23
090 $a B828.2 $b .B477 2023
100 1 $a Bentley, Joseph. $3 945032
245 1 0 $a Logical empiricism and naturalism $h [electronic resource] : $b neurath and Carnap's metatheory of science / $c by Joseph Bentley.
260 $a Cham : $b Springer Nature Switzerland : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2023.
300 $a 1 online resource (xviii, 216 p.) : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
490 1 $a Vienna Circle Institute library ; $v v. 8
505 0 $a Introduction -- 1. Naturalism and the Vienna Circle -- 2. Neurath's Epistemology of Science -- 3. Neurath's Conception of Protocol Statements -- 4. Carnapian Explication -- 5. Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity -- 6. Challenges to the Bipartite Metatheory Interpretation -- 7. Bipartite Metatheory in Application.
520 $a This text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative metatheory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provides a new interpretation of Carnap's conception of analyticity, allowing for a refutation of the Quinean argument for the incompatibility of naturalism and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In doing so, the relevance and potential importance of their scientific meta-theory for contemporary questions in the philosophy of science is demonstrated. This text appeals to students and researchers working on Logical Empiricism, Quine, the history of analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy of science, as well as proponents of naturalized epistemology.
650 0 $a Naturalism. $3 190133
650 0 $a Logical positivism. $3 187712
650 0 $a Science $x Philosophy. $3 179415
650 1 4 $a Analytic Philosophy. $3 739906
650 2 4 $a Philosophy of Science. $3 277156
650 2 4 $a Epistemology. $3 275100
650 2 4 $a History of Philosophy. $3 274764
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 273601
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
830 0 $a Vienna Circle Institute library ; $v v. 6. $3 923184
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29328-3
950 $a Religion and Philosophy (SpringerNature-41175)