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Animal suffering, human rights, and the virtue of justice

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Animal suffering, human rights, and the virtue of justiceby Per Bauhn.
Author:	Bauhn, Per.
Published:	Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2023.
Description:	xiii, 83 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Animal rightsPhilosophy.
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27048-2
ISBN:	9783031270482$q(electronic bk.)

Animal suffering, human rights, and the virtue of justice
Bauhn, Per.

Animal suffering, human rights, and the virtue of justice[electronic resource] /by Per Bauhn. - Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2023. - xiii, 83 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1 Introduction -- References -- 2 The Suffering Inflicted on Non-Human Animals by Human Agents -- References -- 3 Speciesism -- References -- 4 Sentientist Equality -- 4.1 Singer and Animal Rights -- 4.2 Regan and Animal Rights -- References -- 5 Kant on Duties to Animals -- References -- 6 Gewirthian Human Rights and Non-Human Animals -- References -- 7 Why Non-Human Animals Do Not Have Moral Rights -- References -- 8 In Defence of a Speciesist View of the Moral Community -- 8.1 The Amoral Order of Nature -- 8.2 The Case for Eating Meat -- References -- 9 Duties Regarding Animals and the Virtue of Justice -- References.

"Per Bauhn's book presents an original argument about animal rights and is stronger than most of the other arguments presented in the field. Bauhn situates the origin of rights claims in general (including humans) and sets out the structure of all such arguments. Because of the rigor and originality of Bauhn's argument, it will become a topic of conversation within academic circles. This is a must read for those teaching Animal Rights or Environmental Ethics classes. It also sets out a fundamental argument that will stimulate other researchers to take account of this position. Highly recommended." -Michael Boylan, Professor of Philosophy, Marymount University, USA In this book, Per Bauhn does three things. First, he outlines some aspects of contemporary philosophical views on animals and morality, including the criticism of speciesism and the animal rights argument. Second, he criticizes these views, arguing that we cannot escape a speciesist perspective on morality, and that there are no good reasons why we should believe that non-human animals have moral rights. Third, he argues that cruelty against non-human animals is morally wrong, but not because animal rights are being violated but because human agents who inflict cruelty on non-human animals are failing their duty to develop in themselves the virtue of justice. This latter argument is reminiscent of Immanuel Kant's idea that we have only indirect duties towards animals, but unlike that idea, Bauhn's argument does not depend on any causal hypothesis that humans who are cruel to animals are likely to be cruel also to their fellow humans. Instead, Bauhn's argument relies on the fact that being cruel to non-human animals and other innocent beings is conceptually and logically inconsistent with the virtue of justice - a virtue which agents are rationally required to develop in themselves. Per Bauhn is Emeritus Professor of Practical Philosophy at Linnaeus University, Sweden.

ISBN: 9783031270482$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-27048-2doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

583834
Animal rights
--Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: HV4708

Dewey Class. No.: 179.3

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520 $a "Per Bauhn's book presents an original argument about animal rights and is stronger than most of the other arguments presented in the field. Bauhn situates the origin of rights claims in general (including humans) and sets out the structure of all such arguments. Because of the rigor and originality of Bauhn's argument, it will become a topic of conversation within academic circles. This is a must read for those teaching Animal Rights or Environmental Ethics classes. It also sets out a fundamental argument that will stimulate other researchers to take account of this position. Highly recommended." -Michael Boylan, Professor of Philosophy, Marymount University, USA In this book, Per Bauhn does three things. First, he outlines some aspects of contemporary philosophical views on animals and morality, including the criticism of speciesism and the animal rights argument. Second, he criticizes these views, arguing that we cannot escape a speciesist perspective on morality, and that there are no good reasons why we should believe that non-human animals have moral rights. Third, he argues that cruelty against non-human animals is morally wrong, but not because animal rights are being violated but because human agents who inflict cruelty on non-human animals are failing their duty to develop in themselves the virtue of justice. This latter argument is reminiscent of Immanuel Kant's idea that we have only indirect duties towards animals, but unlike that idea, Bauhn's argument does not depend on any causal hypothesis that humans who are cruel to animals are likely to be cruel also to their fellow humans. Instead, Bauhn's argument relies on the fact that being cruel to non-human animals and other innocent beings is conceptually and logically inconsistent with the virtue of justice - a virtue which agents are rationally required to develop in themselves. Per Bauhn is Emeritus Professor of Practical Philosophy at Linnaeus University, Sweden.
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