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Extending the extended mindfrom cognition to consciousness /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Extending the extended mindby Pii Telakivi.
Reminder of title:	from cognition to consciousness /
Author:	Telakivi, Pii.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2023.
Description:	xvi, 217 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Cognition.
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35624-7
ISBN:	9783031356247$q(electronic bk.)

Extending the extended mindfrom cognition to consciousness /
Telakivi, Pii.

Extending the extended mindfrom cognition to consciousness /[electronic resource] :by Pii Telakivi. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2023. - xvi, 217 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - New directions in philosophy and cognitive science. - New directions in philosophy and cognitive science..

1 A Roadmap from the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind -- 1.1 Where Does the Mind Stop? -- 1.2 Concepts of Cognition and Consciousness -- 1.3 4E's: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended -- 1.3.1 Embodied -- 1.3.2 Embedded -- 1.3.3 Enacted -- 1.3.4 Extended -- 1.4 From the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind -- 1.4.1 The Extended Mind -- 1.4.2 The Waves to the Extended Conscious Mind -- 1.4.3 Vehicular Externalism -- 1.5 Conclusions and Methodological Remarks -- References -- 2 Arguments for Extended Conscious Mind -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 First Argument for ECM: Parity Argument -- 2.2.1 Cognition and Consciousness Are Often Inseparable -- 2.2.2 Occurrent EM -- 2.2.3 Wheeler's Objection -- 2.2.4 Summing Up the First Argument -- 2.3 Second Argument for ECM: Sensorimotor Enactivism -- 2.3.1 Landscapes of Sensorimotor Enactivism -- 2.3.2 Bridging the Comparative Explanatory Gap -- 2.3.3 Sensorimotor Reductionism or Sensorimotor Integrationism? -- 2.3.4 Temporal Nature, Virtual Presence -- 2.3.5 Arguments Drawn from Sensorimotor Enactivism in Support of ECM -- 2.3.6 Does Entailment Hold? From the Personal to the Sub-Personal Level -- 2.3.7 Summing Up the Second Argument -- 2.4 Third Argument for ECM: The Leaky Body -- 2.4.1 Experience Is Embodied -- 2.4.2 The Frontiers of the Body Are Not Rigid -- 2.4.3 External Body Parts as Substrates of Experience -- 2.5 Conclusions to the Three Arguments -- References -- 3 The Constitution-Turn and Extended Conscious Mind -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.1.1 The Causal-Constitution Fallacy -- 3.1.2 The Constituted Phenomenon: The Dynamic Nature of Experiences -- 3.2 Defining Constitution -- 3.2.1 Material Constitution -- 3.2.2 Mechanist Constitution -- 3.2.3 Diachronic-Dynamical Constitution -- 3.3 Demarcating the System Boundaries -- 3.3.1 Mutual Manipulability as a Demarcation Criterion -- 3.4 Conclusions -- References -- 4 Tools as Extenders: The Pathway to Functional Incorporation -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Spectrum of Extensions -- 4.2.1 Momentary Extension -- 4.2.2 Integrated Extension -- 4.2.3 Prosthetic Incorporation -- 4.2.4 Functional Incorporation -- 4.2.5 Summing Up the Four Degrees of Extension -- 4.3 "Glue & Trust" Conditions -- 4.3.1 Glue & Trust Conditions for EM -- 4.3.2 Criteria Compared with ECM -- 4.3.3 Glue & Trust Conditions for ECM -- 4.4 An Example of Functional Incorporation: Sensory Substitution -- 4.5 Conclusions -- References -- 5 Possible Objections to Extended Conscious Mind -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.1.1 Clark's Criticisms of ECM -- 5.2 The Argument from High Bandwidth -- 5.2.1 Answers to the High-Bandwidth Argument -- 5.3 Predictive Processing -- 5.3.1 Answering the Counter-argument from Predictive Processing -- 5.4 The Brain-in-a-Vat Thought Experiment -- 5.5 Dreams and Hallucinations -- 5.5.1 Revonsuo's Dream Argument -- 5.5.2 Answering the Dream Challenge -- 5.6 Summarising the Counter-arguments -- References -- 6 Concluding Remarks and the Future of Extension -- References.

This book argues that conscious experience is sometimes extended outside the brain and body into certain kinds of environmental interaction and tool use. It shows that if one accepts that cognitive states can extend, one must also accept that consciousness can extend. The proponents of Extended Mind defend the former claim, but usually oppose the latter claim. The most important undertaking of this book is to show that this partition is not possible on pain of inconsistency. Pii Telakivi presents three arguments for the hypothesis of Extended Conscious Mind, examines and answers the most common counterarguments, and introduces a novel means to interpret and apply the concept of constitution. She also addresses the tensions between analytic philosophy of mind and enactivism, and builds a bridge between two different traditions: on the one hand, extended mind, and on the other, enactivism and embodied mind-and maintains that a unifying approach is necessary for a theory about extended consciousness. Pii Telakivi is a post-doctoral researcher in Practical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki and was a Fulbright Finland Junior Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research focus lies on extended, embodied cognition and consciousness, and at the intersections between philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and psychiatry.

ISBN: 9783031356247$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-35624-7doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

180665
Cognition.

LC Class. No.: BF311

Dewey Class. No.: 153

Extending the extended mindfrom cognition to consciousness /
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505 0 $a 1 A Roadmap from the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind -- 1.1 Where Does the Mind Stop? -- 1.2 Concepts of Cognition and Consciousness -- 1.3 4E's: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended -- 1.3.1 Embodied -- 1.3.2 Embedded -- 1.3.3 Enacted -- 1.3.4 Extended -- 1.4 From the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind -- 1.4.1 The Extended Mind -- 1.4.2 The Waves to the Extended Conscious Mind -- 1.4.3 Vehicular Externalism -- 1.5 Conclusions and Methodological Remarks -- References -- 2 Arguments for Extended Conscious Mind -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 First Argument for ECM: Parity Argument -- 2.2.1 Cognition and Consciousness Are Often Inseparable -- 2.2.2 Occurrent EM -- 2.2.3 Wheeler's Objection -- 2.2.4 Summing Up the First Argument -- 2.3 Second Argument for ECM: Sensorimotor Enactivism -- 2.3.1 Landscapes of Sensorimotor Enactivism -- 2.3.2 Bridging the Comparative Explanatory Gap -- 2.3.3 Sensorimotor Reductionism or Sensorimotor Integrationism? -- 2.3.4 Temporal Nature, Virtual Presence -- 2.3.5 Arguments Drawn from Sensorimotor Enactivism in Support of ECM -- 2.3.6 Does Entailment Hold? From the Personal to the Sub-Personal Level -- 2.3.7 Summing Up the Second Argument -- 2.4 Third Argument for ECM: The Leaky Body -- 2.4.1 Experience Is Embodied -- 2.4.2 The Frontiers of the Body Are Not Rigid -- 2.4.3 External Body Parts as Substrates of Experience -- 2.5 Conclusions to the Three Arguments -- References -- 3 The Constitution-Turn and Extended Conscious Mind -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.1.1 The Causal-Constitution Fallacy -- 3.1.2 The Constituted Phenomenon: The Dynamic Nature of Experiences -- 3.2 Defining Constitution -- 3.2.1 Material Constitution -- 3.2.2 Mechanist Constitution -- 3.2.3 Diachronic-Dynamical Constitution -- 3.3 Demarcating the System Boundaries -- 3.3.1 Mutual Manipulability as a Demarcation Criterion -- 3.4 Conclusions -- References -- 4 Tools as Extenders: The Pathway to Functional Incorporation -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Spectrum of Extensions -- 4.2.1 Momentary Extension -- 4.2.2 Integrated Extension -- 4.2.3 Prosthetic Incorporation -- 4.2.4 Functional Incorporation -- 4.2.5 Summing Up the Four Degrees of Extension -- 4.3 "Glue & Trust" Conditions -- 4.3.1 Glue & Trust Conditions for EM -- 4.3.2 Criteria Compared with ECM -- 4.3.3 Glue & Trust Conditions for ECM -- 4.4 An Example of Functional Incorporation: Sensory Substitution -- 4.5 Conclusions -- References -- 5 Possible Objections to Extended Conscious Mind -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.1.1 Clark's Criticisms of ECM -- 5.2 The Argument from High Bandwidth -- 5.2.1 Answers to the High-Bandwidth Argument -- 5.3 Predictive Processing -- 5.3.1 Answering the Counter-argument from Predictive Processing -- 5.4 The Brain-in-a-Vat Thought Experiment -- 5.5 Dreams and Hallucinations -- 5.5.1 Revonsuo's Dream Argument -- 5.5.2 Answering the Dream Challenge -- 5.6 Summarising the Counter-arguments -- References -- 6 Concluding Remarks and the Future of Extension -- References.
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