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Francis Bacon's skeptical recipes for new knowledge

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Francis Bacon's skeptical recipes for new knowledgeby Jagdish Hattiangadi.
作者:	Hattiangadi, J. N.
出版者:	Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2024.
面頁冊數:	xxxi, 290 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	SciencePhilosophy.
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52585-8
ISBN:	9783031525858$q(electronic bk.)

Francis Bacon's skeptical recipes for new knowledge
Hattiangadi, J. N.

Francis Bacon's skeptical recipes for new knowledge[electronic resource] /by Jagdish Hattiangadi. - Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2024. - xxxi, 290 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

Chapter 1, Logical Doubts Concerning Induction -- Chapter 2, Socrates and the Skeptical Craft -- Chapter 3, The Active Fallibilism of a Situational Skeptic -- Chapter 4, Pyrrhonian, a School of Skeptics -- Chapter 5, Freedom by Confinement -- Chapter 6, The Sphinx -- Chapter 7, Evidence and Its Refutation -- Chapter 8, Francis Bacon's Elenchus -- Chapter 9, A Mathematical Method for Physics -- Chapter 10, A Foundational Skepticism -- Chapter 11, Applying the Foundational Method -- Chapter 12, Applying The Experimental Philosophy.

The book sets an ambitious goal. It devises a new account of scientific methodology that makes it possible to explain how scientists manage, at least occasionally, to find true models of reality. The new methods may be contrasted with all those currently available that employ "coherence theories" of knowledge. Under this designation are grouped positions that can seem very different (such as those of Poincaré, Duhem, Popper, Hempel, Quine, Kuhn, and Feyerabend) but are united by the idea that the most general statements of science are merely hypotheses. They may be conjectures, opinions, conventions, posits, paradigms, or even myths. The most we can claim to know from such generalities is that they are internally consistent and coherent with empirical data. Consistency is insufficient to establish the truth of a conceptual system because many different systems, perhaps an infinite number, can be logically consistent and cohere with recorded data. Such is the well-known problem of the empirical under-determination of theories. Francis Bacon's Skeptical Recipes for New Knowledge suggests a new methodology that solves this fundamental problem of knowledge. Jagdish Hattiangadi is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Canada.

ISBN: 9783031525858$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-52585-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

179415
Science
--Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: Q175

Dewey Class. No.: 501

Francis Bacon's skeptical recipes for new knowledge
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520 $a The book sets an ambitious goal. It devises a new account of scientific methodology that makes it possible to explain how scientists manage, at least occasionally, to find true models of reality. The new methods may be contrasted with all those currently available that employ "coherence theories" of knowledge. Under this designation are grouped positions that can seem very different (such as those of Poincaré, Duhem, Popper, Hempel, Quine, Kuhn, and Feyerabend) but are united by the idea that the most general statements of science are merely hypotheses. They may be conjectures, opinions, conventions, posits, paradigms, or even myths. The most we can claim to know from such generalities is that they are internally consistent and coherent with empirical data. Consistency is insufficient to establish the truth of a conceptual system because many different systems, perhaps an infinite number, can be logically consistent and cohere with recorded data. Such is the well-known problem of the empirical under-determination of theories. Francis Bacon's Skeptical Recipes for New Knowledge suggests a new methodology that solves this fundamental problem of knowledge. Jagdish Hattiangadi is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Canada.
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