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The politics of attracting investmentauthoritarianism, political competition, and the international market for capital /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The politics of attracting investmentby Chase C. Englund.
Reminder of title:	authoritarianism, political competition, and the international market for capital /
Author:	Englund, Chase C.
Published:	Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2024.
Description:	xxiii, 348 p. :ill. (chiefly color), digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Capital investmentsPolitical aspects.
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74951-3
ISBN:	9783031749513$q(electronic bk.)

The politics of attracting investmentauthoritarianism, political competition, and the international market for capital /
Englund, Chase C.

The politics of attracting investmentauthoritarianism, political competition, and the international market for capital /[electronic resource] :by Chase C. Englund. - Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2024. - xxiii, 348 p. :ill. (chiefly color), digital ;24 cm. - Contributions to economics,2197-7178. - Contributions to economics..

Part I. -- Introduction to FDI in Authoritarian States. -- Theoretical Foundations for Understanding Autocratic FDI. -- Understanding FDI under Autocracy: Theoretical Approach. -- Political Competition and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings. -- Economic Elites and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings. -- Testing the Mechanism of Policy Uncertainty. -- Targeted FDI in Nondemocratic States: Empirical Findings. -- FDI in Authoritarian States: Conclusions. -- Part II. -- Examination of Foreign Portfolio Investment. -- Examination of Democratic States. -- Examination of Domestic Investment. -- Applications for Conflict and Foreign Policy. -- Other Types of Elites. -- Conclusions and Policy Implications.

This book provides a tour through a novel theoretical approach to understanding the political economy of authoritarianism and the international market for capital investment. As the author demonstrates through an extensive series of analysis, success in attracting investment (and ultimately fostering growth) lies with the ability of the state to reduce investors' uncertainty. The author explores the market for FDI in nondemocratic states and finds that those states which feature reduced competition over policy between "economic elites" are more likely to attract investment inflows. However, these inflows are the result of incentives provided as private benefits for incumbent elites, and tend to result in concentrated inflows. In Part II, this is contrasted with the way democratic states attract investment through institutional protections and public benefits. In this way, the author uncovers that authoritarian and democratic states achieve investor confidence through "alternate paths to predictability", one based on eliminating opposition through political consolidation and the other based on impartial rules and legal protections designed to constrain the excesses of political competition. The theory's central premise, that the concentration of economic influence with fewer "economic elites" is corrosive to political competition and institutional quality, carries huge significance for the study of both authoritarian and democratic governance quality.

ISBN: 9783031749513$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-74951-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

986715
Capital investments
--Political aspects.

LC Class. No.: HG4028.C4

Dewey Class. No.: 658.152

The politics of attracting investmentauthoritarianism, political competition, and the international market for capital /
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505 0 $a Part I. -- Introduction to FDI in Authoritarian States. -- Theoretical Foundations for Understanding Autocratic FDI. -- Understanding FDI under Autocracy: Theoretical Approach. -- Political Competition and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings. -- Economic Elites and FDI Inflows: Empirical Findings. -- Testing the Mechanism of Policy Uncertainty. -- Targeted FDI in Nondemocratic States: Empirical Findings. -- FDI in Authoritarian States: Conclusions. -- Part II. -- Examination of Foreign Portfolio Investment. -- Examination of Democratic States. -- Examination of Domestic Investment. -- Applications for Conflict and Foreign Policy. -- Other Types of Elites. -- Conclusions and Policy Implications.
520 $a This book provides a tour through a novel theoretical approach to understanding the political economy of authoritarianism and the international market for capital investment. As the author demonstrates through an extensive series of analysis, success in attracting investment (and ultimately fostering growth) lies with the ability of the state to reduce investors' uncertainty. The author explores the market for FDI in nondemocratic states and finds that those states which feature reduced competition over policy between "economic elites" are more likely to attract investment inflows. However, these inflows are the result of incentives provided as private benefits for incumbent elites, and tend to result in concentrated inflows. In Part II, this is contrasted with the way democratic states attract investment through institutional protections and public benefits. In this way, the author uncovers that authoritarian and democratic states achieve investor confidence through "alternate paths to predictability", one based on eliminating opposition through political consolidation and the other based on impartial rules and legal protections designed to constrain the excesses of political competition. The theory's central premise, that the concentration of economic influence with fewer "economic elites" is corrosive to political competition and institutional quality, carries huge significance for the study of both authoritarian and democratic governance quality.
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