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Essays in Industrial Organization /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Industrial Organization /Domenico Fabrizi.
作者:	Fabrizi, Domenico,
面頁冊數:	1 electronic resource (121 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.
附註:	Advisors: Asker, John William Committee members: Rafey, William M.; Hackmann, Martin B.; Board, Simon Adrian.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International85-12B.
標題:	Finance.
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31300468
ISBN:	9798382778020

Essays in Industrial Organization /
Fabrizi, Domenico,

Essays in Industrial Organization /Domenico Fabrizi. - 1 electronic resource (121 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: B.

In this dissertation, I analyze how different selling mechanisms affect welfare. This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapters 1 and 2, I empirically study upgrades - fees that customers pay to access a premium quality product after the purchase of a regular one - and how they affect consumers. On one hand, upgrades might benefit consumers as they allow the purchase of higher-quality goods at a discounted price. On the other hand, the monopolist will seek to capture surplus from these gains from trade by offering a different price menu for all goods. Whether consumer welfare will rise or fall when a monopolist introduces upgrades will depend on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. I disentangle these two effects in the context of an international airline that gives economy class passengers the option to pay an additional fee to upgrade to business class. In Chapter 1, I describe the data and show how the airline uses upgrades. In Chapter 2, I develop and estimate a model of airline pricing in order to assess the effects of upgrades via counterfactual simulations. I show that the upgrade option improves the allocation of passengers among cabins over time and increases consumer and producer welfare by 1.5% and 2% respectively. In Chapter 3, I theoretically study auctions with budget constraints and I compare first price and second price auctions. I show that endowing bidders with the same and commonly known financial constraints reduces seller's revenues, however, this decrease is larger in second price auctions than in first price auctions.

English

ISBN: 9798382778020Subjects--Topical Terms:

183252
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Industrial organizations

Essays in Industrial Organization /
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520 $a In this dissertation, I analyze how different selling mechanisms affect welfare. This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapters 1 and 2, I empirically study upgrades - fees that customers pay to access a premium quality product after the purchase of a regular one - and how they affect consumers. On one hand, upgrades might benefit consumers as they allow the purchase of higher-quality goods at a discounted price. On the other hand, the monopolist will seek to capture surplus from these gains from trade by offering a different price menu for all goods. Whether consumer welfare will rise or fall when a monopolist introduces upgrades will depend on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. I disentangle these two effects in the context of an international airline that gives economy class passengers the option to pay an additional fee to upgrade to business class. In Chapter 1, I describe the data and show how the airline uses upgrades. In Chapter 2, I develop and estimate a model of airline pricing in order to assess the effects of upgrades via counterfactual simulations. I show that the upgrade option improves the allocation of passengers among cabins over time and increases consumer and producer welfare by 1.5% and 2% respectively. In Chapter 3, I theoretically study auctions with budget constraints and I compare first price and second price auctions. I show that endowing bidders with the same and commonly known financial constraints reduces seller's revenues, however, this decrease is larger in second price auctions than in first price auctions.
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653 $a Industrial organizations
653 $a Welfare
653 $a Selling mechanisms
653 $a Customers pay
653 $a Airline pricing
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710 2 $a University of California, Los Angeles. $b Economics 0246. $3 660237
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791 $a Ph.D.
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