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Essays on information and coordinati...

Brindisi, Francesco.

Essays on information and coordination failures.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on information and coordination failures.
Author:	Brindisi, Francesco.
Description:	142 p.
Notes:	Adviser: Alessandra Casella.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-04, Section: A, page: 1467.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International67-04A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3213524
ISBN:	9780542637681

Essays on information and coordination failures.
Brindisi, Francesco.

Essays on information and coordination failures. - 142 p.

Adviser: Alessandra Casella.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2006.

In this dissertation we investigate the theoretical link between asymmetric information and the emergence of coordination failures. We study the impact of endogenous timing on coordination in a dynamic game of investment with strategic complementarities. We show that endogenous timing favors coordination through the endogenous exchange of the information embedded into the observable investment decisions. We analyze the efficiency of investment decisions and consider the role of subsidy policies in increasing the probability of efficient coordination. Finally, we study the determinants of the geographic concentration of economic activity and reconcile theoretically the presence of strategic complementarities with the existence of location-specific fundamentals and the lack of empirical evidence of multiple locational equilibria.

ISBN: 9780542637681Subjects--Topical Terms:

212740
Economics, Theory.

Essays on information and coordination failures.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2006.
520 # $a In this dissertation we investigate the theoretical link between asymmetric information and the emergence of coordination failures. We study the impact of endogenous timing on coordination in a dynamic game of investment with strategic complementarities. We show that endogenous timing favors coordination through the endogenous exchange of the information embedded into the observable investment decisions. We analyze the efficiency of investment decisions and consider the role of subsidy policies in increasing the probability of efficient coordination. Finally, we study the determinants of the geographic concentration of economic activity and reconcile theoretically the presence of strategic complementarities with the existence of location-specific fundamentals and the lack of empirical evidence of multiple locational equilibria.
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