國立高雄大學圖資館 |

Language: English

Back

代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 = Agency Problems, C...

國立高雄大學金融管理學系碩士班

代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 = Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : monographic
Paralel Title:	Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism
Author:	陳美蓮,
Secondary Intellectual Responsibility:	國立高雄大學
Place of Publication:	[高雄市]
Published:	撰者;
Year of Publication:	2009[民98]
Description:	96面圖，表 : 30公分;
Subject:	代理問題
Subject:	Agency Problems
Online resource:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/39136910408500312641
Notes:	參考書目：面86-96
Notes:	指導教授：高蘭芬、陳怡凱
Summary:	本研究主要探討盈餘穩健性是否可以降低利害關係人之間的代理問題，以及公司治理機制與盈餘穩健性是否存在替代關係。實證結果發現台灣企業的會計存在盈餘穩健性，但未出現如美國研究發現會計準則逐年愈來愈保守的現象。本研究廣泛探討企業所存在與利害關係人間的各種代理問題與穩健性的關係，結果發現，儘管盈餘穩健性可以降低經理人因有限責任與有限任期所導致的道德危機，但許多代理問題卻未透過穩健性解決，穩健性反而成為代理問題的一部份。本研究也發現當公司存在可降低代理問題的其他機制時，例如利息保障倍數、現金股利率，以及公司治理機制，公司盈餘穩健性的程度降低，顯示公司治理機制與盈餘穩健性呈現替代關係，當公司治理機制愈好，公司盈餘穩健性程度愈低。 This study examines whether accounting conservatism can mitigate the agency problems and whether the governance role of accounting conservatism could be substituted by corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results show that the accounting conservatism exists in Taiwan corporations. However, there is no evidence that the accounting conservatism in Taiwan is increasing over time, which is inconsistent with those found in the U.S. The empirical results indicate that conservative accounting reduces agency problems due to managers’ limited horizons/liabilities, free cash flows, deviation between control and cash flow rights, and directors’ shares collateralization. However, conservative accounting cannot mitigate interest conflicts induced by over-compensation of managers. Moreover, the results indicate that the level of the accounting conservatism decreases when corporate governance mechanisms are stronger, implying a substitution effect between corporate governance and accounting conservatism.

代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 = Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism
陳, 美蓮

代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 = Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism / 陳美蓮撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 2009[民98]. - 96面 ; 圖，表 ; 30公分.
參考書目：面86-96指導教授：高蘭芬、陳怡凱.
代理問題Agency Problems

代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 = Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism
LDR:02994nam a2200277 4500 001 220340
005 20170214090814.0
009 220340
010 0 $b 平裝
010 0 $b 精裝
100 $a 20170214y2009 k y0chiy09 ea
101 1 $a chi $d chi $d eng
102 $a tw
105 $a ak am 000yy
200 1 $a 代理問題、公司治理與盈餘穩健性 $d Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism $z eng $f 陳美蓮撰
210 $a [高雄市] $c 撰者 $d 2009[民98]
215 0 $a 96面 $c 圖，表 $d 30公分
300 $a 參考書目：面86-96
300 $a 指導教授：高蘭芬、陳怡凱
328 $a 碩士論文--國立高雄大學金融管理學系碩士班
330 $a 本研究主要探討盈餘穩健性是否可以降低利害關係人之間的代理問題，以及公司治理機制與盈餘穩健性是否存在替代關係。實證結果發現台灣企業的會計存在盈餘穩健性，但未出現如美國研究發現會計準則逐年愈來愈保守的現象。本研究廣泛探討企業所存在與利害關係人間的各種代理問題與穩健性的關係，結果發現，儘管盈餘穩健性可以降低經理人因有限責任與有限任期所導致的道德危機，但許多代理問題卻未透過穩健性解決，穩健性反而成為代理問題的一部份。本研究也發現當公司存在可降低代理問題的其他機制時，例如利息保障倍數、現金股利率，以及公司治理機制，公司盈餘穩健性的程度降低，顯示公司治理機制與盈餘穩健性呈現替代關係，當公司治理機制愈好，公司盈餘穩健性程度愈低。 This study examines whether accounting conservatism can mitigate the agency problems and whether the governance role of accounting conservatism could be substituted by corporate governance mechanisms. The empirical results show that the accounting conservatism exists in Taiwan corporations. However, there is no evidence that the accounting conservatism in Taiwan is increasing over time, which is inconsistent with those found in the U.S. The empirical results indicate that conservative accounting reduces agency problems due to managers’ limited horizons/liabilities, free cash flows, deviation between control and cash flow rights, and directors’ shares collateralization. However, conservative accounting cannot mitigate interest conflicts induced by over-compensation of managers. Moreover, the results indicate that the level of the accounting conservatism decreases when corporate governance mechanisms are stronger, implying a substitution effect between corporate governance and accounting conservatism.
510 1 $a Agency Problems, Corporate Governance and Conservatism $z eng
610 0 $a 代理問題 $a 公司治理 $a 穩健會計準則
610 1 $a Agency Problems $a Conservative Accounting $a Corporate Governance
681 $a 008M/0019 $b 343408 $v 2007年版
700 1 $a 陳 $b 美蓮 $4 撰 $3 354009
712 0 2 $a 國立高雄大學 $b 金融管理學系碩士班 $3 354008
801 0 $a tw $b NUK $c 20091020 $g CCR
856 7 $2 http $u http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/39136910408500312641