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技術外溢、研發與誘因 = Technology Spillovers, ...

國立高雄大學經營管理研究所

技術外溢、研發與誘因 = Technology Spillovers, R&D, and Incentives

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : monographic
Paralel Title:	Technology Spillovers, R&D, and Incentives
Author:	郭哲豪,
Secondary Intellectual Responsibility:	國立高雄大學
Place of Publication:	[高雄市]
Published:	撰者;
Year of Publication:	民100
Description:	46葉30公分;
Subject:	技術外溢
Subject:	Technology Spillovers
Online resource:	http://handle.ncl.edu.tw/11296/ndltd/36096862478428853053
Notes:	參考書目：葉35-40
Notes:	內容為英文
Summary:	過去的研究模型中把研發部門視為製造部門的一部分，忽略了研發人員在創新努力中扮演的角色，其結果造成廠商在研發努力與生產成本降低的關係上形成一個理論上的混淆。本文嘗試修改傳統AJ模型(1988)的結構，在模型中將R&D與製造二個部門分離，重新建立一個三階段賽局並利用誘因契約將總管理部門與研發部門做連結，目的在釐清R&D努力與生產成本降低的因果關係。本文發現當外溢效果大於1/2時，外溢效果對廠商的產量、利潤、研發成果與總利潤有負面的影響，但對市場價格則有正面的影響，此外，在研發反效用方面，研發的反效用對廠商的產量、利潤、研發成果、總利潤有負面的影響，但對市場價格則有正面的影響。當總管理部門制定研發預算與誘因契約，假如存在較大的外溢效果時，總管理部門所制定的研發預算與誘因契約也須提高。在研發努力的反效用方面，假使研發的反效用增加，研發預算與誘因契約也必須提高。本文也發現總管理部門對研發部門所制定的研發政策與誘因契約之間有一替代效果。 Past research models on R&D view R&D department as part of the manufacturing department. The ignorance of the innovation roles of R&D personals results in a puzzle in distinguishing R&D efforts from R&D outcome.This article tries to modify the AJ model (1988) by separating R&D department from the manufacturing department. We set up a new three-stage game and utilized the incentive contracts as tools to link HQ and R&D department for the purpose of clarifying the relationship between R&D efforts and R&D outcome.The findings are as follows: When spillover effect is greater than 1/2, the spillover effect will negatively influence the outputs, profits, R&D performance and total profits, but positively influence market price. In terms of the influence of disutility effect for R&D effort, the disutility effect for R&D is negatively influence the outputs, profits, R&D performance and total profits, but positively influence market price.When the HQ sets up R&D budget and incentive contract, if spillover effect is greater, R&D budget and incentive contract should also be higher. In terms of the influence of disutility effect for R&D effort on the R&D budget and incentive contract, if the disutility effect for R&D increases, the R&D budget or incentive contract has to be increased.We also find that the R&D policies of the firm’s HQ towards the R&D department have a substitution effect with the incentive contract.

技術外溢、研發與誘因 = Technology Spillovers, R&D, and Incentives
郭, 哲豪

技術外溢、研發與誘因 = Technology Spillovers, R&D, and Incentives / 郭哲豪撰 - [高雄市] : 撰者, 民100. - 46葉 ; 30公分.
參考書目：葉35-40內容為英文.
技術外溢Technology Spillovers

技術外溢、研發與誘因 = Technology Spillovers, R&D, and Incentives
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