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Epistemic relativism and scepticismu...

Bland, Steven.

Epistemic relativism and scepticismunwinding the braid /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Epistemic relativism and scepticismby Steven Bland.
Reminder of title:	unwinding the braid /
Author:	Bland, Steven.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2018.
Description:	xii, 234 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Relativity.
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3
ISBN:	9783319946733$q(electronic bk.)

Epistemic relativism and scepticismunwinding the braid /
Bland, Steven.

Epistemic relativism and scepticismunwinding the braid /[electronic resource] :by Steven Bland. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2018. - xii, 234 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Principal Argument for Epistemic Relativism -- Chapter 3: Epistemic Relativism in the Analytic Tradition -- Chapter 4: Foundationalism and Coherentism -- Chapter 5: Externalism -- Chapter 6: Particularism and Methodism -- Chapter 7: The Charge of Incoherence -- Chapter 8: The Wittgensteinian Position -- Chapter 9: A Dialectical Strategy -- Chapter 10: Conclusions.

This book confronts the threats of epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism to analytic philosophy. Epistemic relativists reject absolute notions of knowledge and justification, while sceptics claim that knowledge and justification of any kind are unattainable. If either of these views is correct, then there can be no objective basis for thinking that one set of methods does a better job of delivering accurate information than any other set of methods. Philosophers have generally sought to resist these threats by responding to the argument that seems to motivate both positions: the Agrippan trilemma. Steven Bland argues that this is a mistaken strategy. He surveys the most influential responses to the Agrippan trilemma, and shows that none of them succeeds in undermining epistemic relativism. Bland also offers a new, dialectical strategy of challenging epistemic relativism by uncovering how epistemic methods depend on one another for their applications. By means of this novel analysis, the book concludes that there are principled reasons to prefer naturalistic to non-naturalistic methods, even if these reasons do little to ease the threat of scepticism.

ISBN: 9783319946733$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

268637
Relativity.

LC Class. No.: BD221 / .B536 2018

Dewey Class. No.: 121

Epistemic relativism and scepticismunwinding the braid /
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245 1 0 $a Epistemic relativism and scepticism $h [electronic resource] : $b unwinding the braid / $c by Steven Bland.
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505 0 $a Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Principal Argument for Epistemic Relativism -- Chapter 3: Epistemic Relativism in the Analytic Tradition -- Chapter 4: Foundationalism and Coherentism -- Chapter 5: Externalism -- Chapter 6: Particularism and Methodism -- Chapter 7: The Charge of Incoherence -- Chapter 8: The Wittgensteinian Position -- Chapter 9: A Dialectical Strategy -- Chapter 10: Conclusions.
520 $a This book confronts the threats of epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism to analytic philosophy. Epistemic relativists reject absolute notions of knowledge and justification, while sceptics claim that knowledge and justification of any kind are unattainable. If either of these views is correct, then there can be no objective basis for thinking that one set of methods does a better job of delivering accurate information than any other set of methods. Philosophers have generally sought to resist these threats by responding to the argument that seems to motivate both positions: the Agrippan trilemma. Steven Bland argues that this is a mistaken strategy. He surveys the most influential responses to the Agrippan trilemma, and shows that none of them succeeds in undermining epistemic relativism. Bland also offers a new, dialectical strategy of challenging epistemic relativism by uncovering how epistemic methods depend on one another for their applications. By means of this novel analysis, the book concludes that there are principled reasons to prefer naturalistic to non-naturalistic methods, even if these reasons do little to ease the threat of scepticism.
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