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Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought...

Di Lucia, Paolo.

Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is"

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is"edited by Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi.
other author:	Di Lucia, Paolo.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing :2021.
Description:	xxvii, 344 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Intentionality (Philosophy)
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3
ISBN:	9783030541163$q(electronic bk.)

Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is"
Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is"[electronic resource] /edited by Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2021. - xxvii, 344 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

"How, you might wonder, can a puzzle first formulated by a young Scotsman-on-the-make some 300 years ago be of interest today? This collection provides a valuable and comprehensive set of answers to this question. It shows why not only Hume, but also Searle, are still of so much importance." - Barry Smith, SUNY Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Julian Park Chair, University of Buffalo, USA This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle's 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is'' sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you 'ought' to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein's philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle's essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought".

ISBN: 9783030541163$q(electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3doiSubjects--Personal Names:

187652
Searle, John R.
Subjects--Topical Terms:

267829
Intentionality (Philosophy)

LC Class. No.: B1649.S264 / R48 2021

Dewey Class. No.: 191

Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is"
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